BASBY v. PATTERSON.

An opposite doctrine prevails in Massachusetts: Stanton v.
Xietropolitan Railroad, 14 Allen 485; .Feital v. .ailrbad, 109
Mass. 398; Smith v. Boston Railroad,120 Id. 490; 11 Am. Law
Rev. 780 ; Lyons v. -Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387 ; but the cases there
upon this point have been said "to depend upon peculiar legislation
rather than on any general principles of justice or law :" Pila.
Railroadv. Towboat Co., 23 Howard 218.
ANGELO T. FREEDLEY.
(To be continued.)
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
EASBY v. PATTERSON.
In an action for use and occupation, a contract express or implied must be proved.
A. occupied the dock adjoining B.'s wharf on the river Delaware with lighters
unloading a ship at the next wharf, so that no vessel could use B.'s wharf without
the removal of the lighters. A. refused to pay dockage to B. There was no evidenco that any vessel had been prevented from coming to B.'s wharf on account of
this occupation. In an action for assumpsit for use and occupation brought by B.,
Held, that judgment of nonsuit was properly entered.
ERROR to the Common Pleas No. 4, of Philadelphia county.
Assumpsit by William Easby against Robert Patterson & Son,
for the use and occupation of plaintiff's dock.
On the trial, before THAYER, P. J., it appeared that the plaintiff
was the owner of a wharf on the Delaware river, at the foot of
Queen street, in the city of Philadelphia. The defendants were
lightermen, whose business it was to load and unload vessels lying
at the wharves. Between the plaintiff's wharf and the one adjoining, was a dock eighty feet in width, as required by the Act of
Assembly of April 8th 1868.1 In June or July 1876, a vessel
was lying in the dock, moored to the side of the wharf adjoining
plaintiff's, and the defendants were employed in discharging the
cargo or ballast, and occupied the dock room to within a few feet
I "No license shall be granted under which a new wharf is to be built, unless the
property from which said wharf is to be extended shall have appertaining thereto,
sufficient breadth to have a dock or water surface at least forty feet wide on each
side of such wharf, unless such Board of Wardens, by a vote of a majority of the
whole board, shall decide that the public convenience demands a variance from this
-ule in any particular case :" Pamph. L. 756.
VOt,. XXVI.-19
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of plaintiff's dock. The plaintiff testified: "I do not know that
they" (te lighters) "actually prevented any vessel coming to my
wharf. I do claim for the use of my dock, although it was not
then used by me; just as if I should claim if a man used my
unoccupied house. I cannot give you any instance in which a
vessel was prevented from coming to my wharf by the defendants'
acts above detailed. My claim is for use and occupation; there
was no instance of special damage." It was also in evidence
that plaintiff had requested payment, which was refused; and that
he had cast off the lines which had been made fast to his wharf
from the lighters, but he distinctly disclaimed making any charge
except for the use of the dock.
On defendants' motion the court entered a nonsuit, which the
court below refused to take off. Plaintiff took this writ of error,
assigning for error the refusal to take off the nonsuit.
Hunn Hanson, for plaintiff in error.-The Commonwealth has
conferred upon the plaintiff the right to charge for the use of
the dock (Act of April 8th 1868, Pamph. L. 755, sect. 2).
"The water or dock left for the use of any wharf shall remain
vested in the Commonwealth, subject to existing laws, but the owner
of such wharf shall be entitled to charge and receive compensation
for the use of the same, and to enjoy all the rights and privileges
in connection therewith, to which he is now by law entitled." The
word "same" clearly refers to "the water or dock left," &c., and
the proviso is inserted because of the declaration in the first clause
of the section that the water or dock shall remain vested in the
Commonwealth. No act was necessary to permit the owner of the
wharf to charge for its use. The interpretation must be in accordance with common sense: G-yger's Estate, 15 P. F. Smith 31;
Commonwealth v. .Railroad Co., 8 Id. 62-9. There is a special
provision for cases of dispute in regard to the charge for dockage:
Act April 8th 1851, sect. 5, (Pamph. L. 354).
It was enough to show occupation and the right to payment,
without any special damage.
The right to charge for dockage and moorage existed at common
law: Lilly's Entries 38; 3 Wentworth P1. 61; Chit. P1. 42,
7th ed.
N. Dubois Miller, (with whom was A. Sydney Biddle), contra.
-- The title to the water remaining in the Commonwealth, plaintiff
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must show some special authority to charge for its use; it required
sn Act of Assembly to give title in the riparian owner even to the
wharf: Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter,11 P. F. Smith 301.
An assumpsit cannot be maintained by one in whom there is no
title: &ephens v. Coster, 1 Win. Black. 423; C. & A. Railroad
Co. v. Finch, 5 Sanf. (N. Y.) 48; Sherlock v. Bainbridge,41Ind.
35; Original Hfartlepool Colleries O. v. Gibb, Law Rep. 5 Oh
Div. 713.
There can be no implied contract, there is no quid pro quo.
Hanson, in reply.-The license to charge for the use of the dock
was property, and although defendants might have been trespassers,
yet the plaintiff may waive the trespass, and sue upon the contract:
Howard v. Shaw, 8 M. & W. 111.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, C. J.-We think it very clear that the evidence
showed no such permissive occupation of the plaintiff's wharf or
dock as would raise an implied assumpsit. It did not appear that
the plaintiff was at any time prevented from the full enjoyment of
his property. The defendants refused to pay when required to do
so, and the plaintiff and his son cast off the line from his wharf. In
an action for use and occupation, a contract, expressed or implied,
must be proved: Brolaskly v. Ferguson, 12 Wright 434. So far
from the plaintiff having consented to the defendant's occupation,
the evidence showed a distinct refusal on his part. It would be confounding all the distinctions in the legal forms of actions to sanction a recovery under these circumstances, and the learned judge
below was entirely right in entering a nonsuit.
Judgment affirmed.
The edition of "Angell on Watercourses," published in 1877, is the latest
work that has appeared on the law relating to water-rights. Since then, a number of cases on this subject have been
decided; and those pertaining to navigable waters, it is proposed to review in
the following note. The questions raised
in these cases may be conveniently
divided into two. First. The rights of
the state and the public in navigable
waters, and in the land under them.
Secondly. The rights of the riparian or

adjacent landowner in such waters, and
in their beds and shore.
I. The first question may be again subdivided, as follows :1. Navigable waters defined.
2. Rights the state may exercise over
such waters tr the purposes of navigation.
3. Public right of navigation.
4. Right of the state to place obstruc.
tions in such waters.
(a) Bridges.
(b) Dams.
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5. Ferries.
6. Title of the state to the bed and
shore of tidal waters.
7. Title to the bed of non-tidal waters.
(a) Lakes.
(b) Rivers.
8. Fisheries.
1. Waters, in the United States, which
are navigable in fact, are so regarded in
law,without reference to the ebb and flow
of the tide: Healy v. Railroad Co., 2
Brad. (Ill.)
435; Houck v. Yates, 82
111. 179; Diedrich v. Railroad Co., 42
Wisc. 248. It has been held that this
navigable capacity need not continue
throughout the whole year: Olson v.
Merrill, 42 Wise. 203; and the mere
capacity to float logs to market has been
considered sufficient to constitute navigability: Olson v. Merrill, supra.
2. In Carondelet, 4-c. v. Parker, 29
La. An. 430, it was held that the state
legislature may authorize the conversion
of an unnavigable into a navigable
stream; and the imposition of charge on
vessels navigating the stream, in its converted state, is not unlawful nor in violation either of the Constitution of the
United States, art. 1, J 10, which provides that "no state shall, without the
consent of Congress, lay any duty on
tonnage ;" nor of the Act of Congress
admitting Louisiana into the Union,
which provides that all navigable waters
leading into the gulf of Mlexico should be
common highways, free of toll or duty;
or of the United States Rev. Stat.,
5251, which says that all navigable
waters in the former territory of Louisiana shall be common highways. And
eo in Wisc. Imp. Co. v. Manson, 43
Wise. 255, it was held that the provision
in the state Constitution (art. ix., 1),
that the "river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi,
St. Lawrence, * * * shall be common
nighways and forever free"I to the inhabitants of the United States, &c., did
not deprive the legislature of the power
to authorize the clearing out of the chan-

nel, and the construction of works in
such a navigable stream for the purpose
of improving navigation, and of charging
toll for the navigation of the stream
when so improved.
3. A navigable river is a public highway, navigable by the public. Accordingly, a riparian owner has a right to
moor a vessel of ordinary size alongside
his wharf for unloading, &c., at reasonable times; and the courts will restrain
by injunction the owner of adjoining
premises from interfering with the access
of such vessel, even though the vessel
may overlap his own premises; though
such vessel would not be allowed to interfere with the proper right of access to
the neighboring premises if used as a
wharf, nor to the free entrance to or
exit from such premises if used as a
dock by other vessels: Original Hartlepool Co. v. Gibb, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 713;
and so in Delaware Ricer Co. v. Burlington 4- Bristol Steam Ferry Co., 81 Penn.
St. 103, it was held that any one may
moor his boats where he. likes in the river,
even in front of another's dock or slips,
but not so as to wilfully obstruct the
riparian owner's egress and ingress.
4. (a) A bridge over a navigablo
stream is considered real estate, and is
assessed as such for taxation: Hudson
River Bridge Co. v. Patterson, 74 N.
Y. 365.
The right to authorize the erection of
a bridge is (in Texas), a franchise vested in the legislature: Hudson et al. v.
Cuero, 4-c., Co., 47 Texas 57 ; when the
erection of a bridge has been properly
authorized by law, the navigation of a
river may be so far obstructed as is reasonably necessary for the construction of
the bridge: B. 4- 0. Railroad Co. v. W.
P. 4- C. Railroad Co., 32 Ohio St. 116.
In Blackwell v. 0. C. Railroad Co.,
122 Mass. 1, an action was brought by
the owner of a wharf on a navigable
stream to recover damages caused by the
erection of a bridge which cut off his access to the sea. There was no other
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wharf on the river, and the declaration
set up direct injury to the general navigation of the stream: Beld, that the fact
of there being but one navigator of the
stream did not show that the injury done
him was different in kind from the rest
of the public; for any one might afterwards navigate the river; there was
merely a difference in degree, and the
action brought by him would not lie.
His proper remedy was by indictment.
In Healy v. Railroad Co., supra, defendants were authorized by their charter to construct their road over a watercourse so as not to impair its usefulness
as such: Held, that a bridge erected
without fulfilling this condition of the
charter was as much a nuisance as though
it had been erected without any authority at all. In Hudson et al. v. Cuero,
supra, the court seemed to be of the opinion that, as a pontoon bridge was somewhat similar to a ferry, the authority to
establish the former, coupled with certain
limitations, was a pro tanto limitation to
establish the latter.
4. (b) A dam not authorized by law
is a public nuisance: In re Eldred, 46
Wis. 530. Until Congress has actually
exercised its right to legislate over the
subject, the statute of a state authorizing
the erection of dams, improvements, &c.,
in a navigable stream, cannot be questioned by an individual on the ground
that it conflicts with the power of the
United States to legislate over the public
waters of the United States : Wis. Imp.
Co. v. fanson, 43 Wis. 255. A state
may authorize the erection of a dam in a
navigable river, wholly within its limits:
Pound v. Turck, 5 Otto 459; for the
improvement ofnavigation : Tewksbury v.
&iqkulenberg, 41 Wis. 584; and even
for other purposes: State v. City of Eau
Claire, 40 Wis. 533. Where the legislature authorizes the construction of a
dam, with a proviso that it shall not substantially obstruct navigation, the court
will not assume that such a dam cannot
be erected, nor restrain the erection

thereof. If the dam whet" erected will
obstruct the stream, then it is unlawful:
see preceding case. The legislature may
also authorize persons to collect reasonable tolls for the increased facilities
afforded to navigation: Tewkbury v.
Schulenberg, supra; and in Wis. Imp.
Co. v. Manson, supra, an act empowering plaintiff to collect such tolls as shall
be no greater than are reasonable, in
consequence of the increased navigable
capacity of the stream, was held valid.
In the same caso the court held that
though the whole of the stream was occupied by a dam, this was no defence in an
action for tolls.
5. The grant of a franchise of a ferry
over a river separating two states, by a
state to one of its citizens, is valid,
though the grantee has not the title to
the termini named in the grant, and
though he has not the right to land outside the jurisdiction of his own state.
For such a grant there need not be concurrent action between the two states :
Columbia Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 38 N. J.
39. In Hudson v. Cuero, supra, it was
held that where private land leading to a
public ferry, which had been operated by
the owner of such land, has been used by
the public as a road for thirty years, it is
a presumption that the public has acquired the title in it. It was further decided
in this case that the erection, by the authority 9f the legislature, of a toll bridge
across a river where a ferry had been previously operated by the riparian owner,
imposed no new servitude upon the laud,
and entitled the owner to no compensation, even though the bridge was attached at its end on his land.
6. The old English rule that the state
owns the bed in all tidal waters has
not been departed from in America, and
the cases affirming that doctrine need not
therefore be cited. The state ordinarily
owns the shore, and the riparian owner
takes to the high-water line: Bailey v.
Burges, 11 R. I. 330. In Hinman v.
Warren, 6 Oregon 408, it was held that
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the United States is only the guardian of
the rights ef a territory before it becomes
a state, and, therefore, it has no right to
dispose of the fee of the land in a territory lying below the high-water line.
This doctrine has been asserted beforesee cases cited in the opinion of the court
in this case-but its soundness may be
questioned. In Pennsylvania the riparian proprietor owns absolutely not only
to the high-water line, but he has a qualified ownership in the tide lands also:
Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Penn. St. 80;
and in Pennsylvania as well as in Oregon
the state has no authority to dispose of
its tide lands so as to interfere with the
public right of navigation; but the grantee of such lands takes them subject to
.all the easements growing out of the public
ighit of navigation: Philadelphiav. Scott,
supra ; Hinman v. Marren, supra. In Al.egheny City v. Moorehead, 80 Penn. St.
118, the state, owning the northern
shore of the Allegheny river, laid out a
street along the river edge, and made a
grant of town lots, which were described
as bounded by the northern side of
"Bank lane," "as it runs by the
courses of the river." There was opposite this street an island which, owing to
t series of floods, disappeared, and the
c-hannel of the river becoming shallow,
and the lines of high and low-water
indistinct between the main shore and
the former island, an act, that of April
18th 1858, was passed to fix the water
lines. The act enacted that "all riparian rights now vested in the state
lying between high-water lines and the
river shall be vested in the corporations
in which the same shall be." The lowwater line was then extended over part
of the former island, and Bank lane
was widened by the city and lot-owners.
It was contended by the plaintiffs that
the extended low-water line had become
the southern boundary of Bank lane;
that the Act of 1858 had vested in the
city, as riparian owner, the rights of the
stite in the locus in quo ; that the filling

up of Bank lane was "secretion," and
vested in the city, or at least in the lotowners, and that, therefore, any grant
of land between Bank lane and the extended low-water line was void ; but the
court held that the extension of the lowwater line did not divest the state of the
title to the land between the old and new
low-water line ; that the Act of 1858 was
not a grant of any soil, but only a description of riparian boundaries ; that
the filling up and widening of Bank
lane was not "accretion" or "dereliction" of water, and that the lot-owners
took only to the middle of Bank lane, the
state still holding the other half, and the
soil south. The court then said that the
grant of soil of the bed or channel by
the state was valid, unless it interfered
with the easement of public navigation,
.and that question had not been raised
here. In Minnesota, however, the riparian owner holds to the low-water line:
Brisbine v. Railroad Co., 23 Minn. 114.
7. (a) In navigable lakes and ponds
the state holds to the ordinary waterline: Deloplaine v. Railroad Co., 42
Wis. 214; Booran v. Sunnurhs, 42 Id.
233; Diedrich v. Railroad Co., 42 Id.
249. In Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St.
492, the same rule was held to prevail in
the waters of Lake Eric and Sandusky
Bay.
The same rule has been recognised in
some of the states in regard to navigable
but non-tidal streams: Moorev. Jackson,
2 Abb. New Cases (N. Y.) 212; McCready v. Comnonwealth, 27 Gratt. (Va.)
985.
In Olson v. Merrill, supra, however,
it was held that one holding both banks
of a navigable stream took usque ad
mediuamfiluin aquce, and in Delaplainev.
Railroad Co., supra, one holding but one
bank took to the thread of the stream,
subject to the public easement of navigation.
In Sloan v. l3iemiller, supra, the court
said that the rule had been laid down in
that state that the riparian owner took to
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the thread of the stream, and the court
would not review this doctrine in that
case. In Hnuck v. Yates, supra, the grantee of lands from the United States was
held to take to the thread of the stream
where the Mississippi river formed the
boundary of such lands.
In Ross v. Fatst, 54 Ind. 471, thisquesti n was left open, and the court further
declined to decide in whom was vested the
title to the beds of navigable fresh water
rivers in the territory of the northwest
of the Ohio river. In City of Norfolk v.
Cooke, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 430, it was held
that a patent for the bed of a navigable
stream granted to any individual was
void.
8. In Lake Erie the right of fishing
in the body of the lake or near the shore
is not confined to the riparian owner ;
nor can such right be acquired by one
alone exercising it for a long period of
time: Sloan v. Biemiller, supra. In the
preceding case the grantor made a grant
of land on Lake Erie, reserving to himself the right to land on the shore thereof for the purpose of landing tackle, &c.,
and inhibiting the grantee from fishing
in the lake. Held, that such inhibition
was inoperative, and that the grantee
could land his tackle used in fishing in
the body of the lake, and not in immediate connection with the adjacent shore.
IL The second division of this subject,
containing the rights of the riparian proprietor in the waters adjacent to his land,
admits of the following subdivisions:
1. Riparian rights described.
2. Riparian owner's rights limited and
defined by meandering and surveyor's
lines.
3. Rights of the grantee of land separated by a public street from navigable
waters.
4. Riparian owner's right of preference to a franchise.
5. Accretion and dereliction.
6. Establishing of harbor lines. Filling up.
7. (a) Right of access to water.

(b) Compensation for cutting off the
same.
8. Right to place permanent obstructions in navigable waters.
(a) Booms.
(b) Breakwaters.
(c) Wharves.
(d) Compensation for use~of a publie stream.
9. Rules relating to wharfage.
(a) Cap-logs.
(b) What are adjoining wharves.
(c) Dry-docks.
(d) Compensation for wharfage.
(e) When a wharf used as a highway is still a wharf.
10. (a) Right of user in public dock.
(b) Compensation for use of public
dock.
1. Riparian rights proper are held to
rest upon title to the bank of the water,
and not upon title to the soil under the
water. They are the same whether the
riparian proprietor owns the soil under the water or not, and distinguished
from the right arising in the case of accretion or dereliction, the general right
of appropriating and occupying the soil,
is not properly a riparian right, resting
upon title to the bank, but more directly
upon title to the soil itself underneath the
water: per RYAN, C. J., Dielrich v.
Railroad Co., supra.
2. The United States surveyor cannot
determine by his survey the navigability
of streams, nor by meandering lines define the riparian owner's rights in the bed
of the water: Ross v. Faust, sutpra.
Where the theoretical line, mcand.red by
the United States surveyor, defining the
edge of a lake or pond, differs from the
actual water-line, the latter is considered
the true boundary of a lot bounded in
terms by the meandered line: Boormav. Sunnuchs, snpra; but a line meandered between the Mississippi river and a
fractional section of land to determine
the amount of land in such section cannot
be regarded as the boundary line, where
there are no monuments and no such line
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described in the surveyor's office; in
such case the river is taken as the real
boundary line: Hauck v. Yates, supra.
The owner of land on any meandered
lake or pond takes no fee in the bed,
where he purchases by such survey, but
takes the same rights as though the water
was navigable, whether it be so or not:
Boorman v. Sunnuchs, supra.
3. The grantee of land, described in
terms, as bounded by a public street,
which separates it from navigable waters,
is not the riparian owner: Brisbine v.
.RailroadCo., supra; Allegheny City v.
Moorhead, supra ; Pfople v. Colgate, 67
N. Y. 512, and ordinarily it has been held
that such grantee takes the fee to the
centre of the street, and the owner of
the other half of the street is the riparian
owner: Brisbine v. Railroad Co., supra ;
Allegheny City v. Moorehead, supra ; but
in People v. Colgate, supra, it was held,
where one had dedicated a street and
conveyed lots, described as bounded by
the street, that the grantee took only an
easement in the street, and the fee remained in the grantor. In City of Norfolk v. Cooke, supra, the city holding
the tee in lots on a street bordering on a
river as well as the street, was adjudged
to be the riparian owner.
4. The riparian owner has no greater
claim than a stranger to the grant of a
legislative franchise of a right in the
river, and if there be any preference
given by statute it may at any time be
repealed in the discretion of the legislature; but if the grant of such a franchise
be made to one not the riparian owner,
and it becomes necessary in the exercise
of the franchise to take his property or
impose a new servitude on his land,
adequate compensation must be made:
Hudson v. Cuero, &c., Co., supra.
5. In A'et'heny City v. Moorehead,
supra, a stret vas widened and filled up
to a defined wdlth by various parties,
and this was held not to be accretion, or
dereliction of water. (For facts in full,
see ante, p. 150.)
6. The establishment of an exterior

harbor-line by the state gives, ipsofado,
the riparian owner the right to fill out to
it, and where the grantee of the riparian
owner, on the establishment of such line
fills up to it, he holds such acquired land
not from his grantee, but directly from
the state: Bailey v. Burges, supra. In
gngs v. Peckham, 11 R. I. 218, A. and
B. owned piers on either side of a dock,
at the inland end of which B. owned
the land. On the state's establishing an
exterior harbor-line B. filled out to it,
and A. filed a bill for relief, complaining
that the fee of the bed of the dock was
in the state, and that he had an easement
in the water. The court, however, held
that A. had only an easement in the
water of the dock while it remained
open, but the establishment of the harborline gave B. a right to fill out to it, and
extinguished A.'s easement.
Quoere, in this case, how far such
public rights, as fishing, navigation, &c.,
are given the riparian proprietor before
he has actually filled up.
In Central Wharf Co. v. India Wharf
Co., 123 Mlass. 561, A. and B. owned
adjacent wharves with dock between
them, B. owning the land under the
dock. B. granted to A. the right of
passage and use of dock for shipping
purposes, &c., and covenanted not to
erect any buildings on it. A street was
built across the dock by the state and the
dock filled up. B. then erected buildings, and the court held that A.'s easement was limited to the open dock, and
when this was filled up, by the act of the
city, the covenants relative to the erection of buildings between A. and B.
became inoperative.
Where lots are granted, described as
bounded shoreward by an exterior line,
part of which touches tide-water and
part not, and an exterior harbor-line is
established by the state, only the grantee
of those lots actually touching tide-water
can fill up, though the others be separated
but by a few feet from it: Bailey v.
Burgess, supra.
7. (a) The riparian owner on navi-
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gable water has the right of access to it,
subject to the public right of navigation:
Boonnan v. Sunnucht, supra; City qf
Norfolk v. Cooke, supra, and in Ddaplaini v. Railrad Co., he was held to
have the exclusive right of access to the
waters of navigable lakes, subject to the
public easement.
(b) In City of Norfolk v. Cooke, supra,
tais right was considered to be property,
and in Ddaplainev. RailroadCo., supra,
it was held to be of pecuniary value to
the riparian owner. In the preceding
case the court left undecided, whether
the state could authorize a railway company to destroy the riparian owner's
right of access without compensation,
but said that, where a railway was built
in the water near the shore, leaving a
stagnant pool of water in front of the
riparian owner's property, an action for
damages wouhl lie. In all the eases on
this subject it appears that the riparian
owner holds the right of access always
subject to the right of the state to improve navigation, &c. Thus, in Philadeiphia v. Scott, supra, it was held that
the state could bank off the riparian
owner's approach to the water without
compensation, provided this was done to
improve the navigation of the river, and
so in Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 7
Weekly Notes of Cases 322, the court
held that damages could not be recovered
for injury to a fishery by the erection of
a wall or bank authorized by the legislature to keep out the overflow of water.
8. (a) It was held in Stevens Point
Boom Co. v. Reilly, 46 Wis. 237, that
the riparian proprietor may, when not
prohibited by statute, construct booms
in front of his lands to aid in floating
logs, if he does not obstruct thereby the
navigation of the stream. Such booms
may extend to the point of navigation ;
but he cannot, though owning both
banks, stretch the boom across the
stream. These obstructions must never
obstruct navigation, and in considering
what an obstruction is the character of
VOL. XXVIII.-20

the navigation common to the river must
be taken into consideration. In Moore
v. Jackson, 2 Abb. New Cases 211, a
raft of timber moored continuously on the
shore of a navigable river was held to be
a purpresture and a public nuisance.
(b In Diedrichv. Railroad Co., supra,
it was held that a riparian owner may
lawfully intrude into the water for the
construction of a breakwater to benefit
his land, which was washing awae, if he
does not obstruct the river's navigation.
He cannot, however, acquire the fee in
the land occupied by the breakwater, and
consequently he could not recover from a
railway company which made use of his
breakwater in a way not to injure it for
the purposes for which it was erected.
(c) In Virginia and in Wisconsin
the riparian owner has the exclusive
right to construct wharves, piers, &c.,
in the water in front of his land in aid
of navigation: Norfolk City v. Cooke,
supra ; Delaplaine v. Railroad Co., supra; Boorman v. Sunnuclhs, supra; Diedrich v. Railroad Co., supra, and in
Rippe v. Railroad Co., 23 ]dlunn. 18, it
was held that the riparian owner may
construct a wharf or landing in front of
his land in the stream for the furtherance
of commerce and navigation, as far as
the point of navigability. In Cob&? n v.
Ames et al., 52 Cal. 385, it was decided
that if obstructions or wharves are placed
in navigable waters below the low-water
mark, they may be abated as nuisances.
In this case a wharf was erected extending below the low-water mark, and it
was held that the riparian owner could"
not bring ejectment for that part below
the low-water line, though the state
could. The court left undecided whether
a riparian owner can wharf out into deep
water.
(d) An action for use and occupation
cannot be sustained by the riparian
owner against one who, by his consent,
has moored rafts, &c., continuously on
the riparian owner's land on a navigable
stream ; for the riparian owner has but
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an casement of navigation in the stream,
and cannot appropriate any part of it for
his own exclusive use, and consequently
cannot charge for the use of it : Moore
v. Jackson, supra.
9. (a) In Reading Railroad Co. v.
Ervin, 7 Weekly Notes of Cases 73, it
was left to tile jury to say whether the
defendants were guilty of negligence in
not having cap-logs on their wharf; but
in Kennedy v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 365, the
court said that a series of cases had decided that tile defendants were charged
with keeping the wharf in safe repair,
and consequently the court would assume
that it was the defendant's duty to have
their wharf guarded by cap-logs.
In Simpson v. Neill, 7 Weekly Notes
of Cases 85, A. owned a portion of a
wharf with a pier extending into the river,
and B. owned the remaining part of the
wharf with a pier parallel with and at the
distance of some sixty feet from A.'s
pier, with a dock between the piers.
Hedd, that these piers were adjoining
wharves, and within the meaning of the
Act of Assembly April 8th 1851, which
usel tile words "adjoining wharves."
(c) A dry-dock floating in a navigable river, and moored to a wharf, is a
marine structure, like any ordinary yes-

sel, and is subject to the admiralty jurib
diction : Tug Ceres, 7 Weekly Notes o
Cases 576.
(d) In the absence of any agreement
.etween lie parties with regard to wharfage, tle wharfinger is entitled to just
and reasonable compensation for the use
of his wharf: Ex parle Easton, 5 Otto
68.
(e) In Contractors of Union Fl7,arfv.
Steamer Starin, 45 Conn. 585, a portion
of a dock alongside a pier was filled up.
and part of the pier used for some time
as a public highway: ield, that though
this part of the pier was used as a highway, yet as long as it was used also as a
landing-place for goods, it was still for
that purpose a wharf, and goods landed
on it were liable for wharfage.
10. (a) One cannot, by any use of a
navigable dock, gain such a right of way
therein as will enable him to maintain a
claim for damages, for its obstruction by
a railway, whereby vessels are prevented
from approaching his private dock:
Thayer v. Railroad Co., 125 Mass. 253.
It was held in the principal case that
the owner of a wharf has not such a property in a dock alongside his wharf, as
will allow him to maintain an action for
the use and occupation of the same.
ARTnUR BIDDLE.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
STATE EX REL. FERRY v. WILLIAMS.
Every person is entitled to the inspection of documents of a public nature, provided lie shows the requisite interest therein.
It is not necessary that a suit should be pending before such inspection will be
granted. It is sufficient, if the person seeking inspection has such interest in a
specific controversy as will enable him to maintain or defend an action, for
which the public documents will furnish competent evidence or necessary infornation.
It is not essential that he should be legally capable of maintaining or defending an
action in his own private behalf; but it will entitle him to inspection, if he may act
in such suit as a representative of a common or public right.
Courts may, in their discretion, at the instance of private persons, act by mandamus, certiorari or quo warranto, for the redress or prevenktn of public wrongs by
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public bodies and officers, whose official sphere is confined to some political dirision
of the state, whenever the applicant is one of the class of persons to be most directly
affected in their enjoyment of public rights, and the public convenience will be subserved by the remedy desired.
A citizen desiring to ascertain whether the provisions of the city charter in regard
to licensing saloons have been observed, with a view of securing due obedience to
the law, is entitled to an inspection of the papers which are made by law the basis
for the issue of licenses.

ON application for mandamus.
By a supplement to the charter of the town of Orange, approved
March 30th 1875 (Pamph. L., p. 399, § 8), it was provided that no
person should be allowed to sell ale, &c., within the city limits,
unless he were first licensed by the collector of taxes, had paid a
license fee and had filed with the collector a letter of recommendation, signed by six legal voters and freeholders, who had signed no
other recommendation within a year, to the effect that the applicant
was of good moral character and of good repute for temperance.
The relator in this case, a citizen of Orange, believing that the requirements of this law as to these letters of recommendation were
not obeyed, and desiring, with other citizens, to secure a due observance of its provisions, applied to the defendant, the collector of
taxes, for an inspection of the letters on which then existing licenses
had been granted. The defendant refused his request, and the
common council, on appeal to them, approved of this refusal, and
instructed the defendant to persist therein.
The relator then
brought this petition for a mandamus to enforce his right of
inspection.
J. H. Stone, for the relator.
J. L. Blake and J. Vanatta, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DIXON, J.-Whether the relator has the right claimed or not
must be decided by general principles, since the statutes of the state
are silent on the subject. The documents in question are of a public nature, and the rule is that every person is entitled to the inspection of such instruments, provided he shows the requisite interest
therein. And as Lord DENMAN remarlks in Rex v. Justice8 of
Staffordshire, 6 Ad. & E. 84, the court is by no means disposed to
narrow its authority to enforce by mandamus the production of
every document of a public nature in which any citizen can prove
himself to be interested. For such persons, indeed, every officer
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appointed by law to keep records ought to deem himself for that
purpose a trustee.
The relator asserts no interest to be subserved by an inspection
of these letters, except that common interest which every citizen
has in the enforcement of the laws and ordinances of the community wherein he dwells.
In England, the occasions which generally have required the
exercise of the power of the court to enforce the inspection of public documents, have been those where a party has sought evidence
for the prosecution or defence of his rights in pending litigation.
In such cases, when the custodian of the documents was a party in
the cause, the court usually intervened by rule, otherwise by mandamus. But the existence of a suit was not a sine qua non for the
exertion of the power. In Rex v. Lucas et al., 10 East 235, a
mandamus was sought to compel the steward of the manor to permit one claiming certain copyhold lands within the manor to inspect
the court-rolls and take copies. The lord, claiming himself to be
the owner of the lands, resisted, on the ground that there was no
cause depending; but the Court of King's Bench granted the writ,
notwithstanding the opinion before expressed in Rex v. Allgood, 7
T. R. 746, Lord ELLENBOROUGH saying: "I do not know why there
should be any cause depending in order to found application of this
sort. This is not the impertinent intrusion of a stranger, but the
application of one who is clearly entitled to the copyhold, unless
there be a conveyance of it by those under whom he claims; he
may, therefore, well require to see whether there appears upon the
rolls to be any such conveyance." So, in Rex v. Tower, 4 lMi.
& S.
162, on a controversy, but without suit, between a tenant of the
manor and the lord, as to cutting underwood, the court granted a
mandamus to inspect the court-rolls so far as related to that subject.
Likewise in Rex v. Justices of -Leicester,4 B. & C. 891, a mandamus was granted that certain ratepayers be allowed to inspect
and take copies of the proceedings and documents relating to the
parish rates, although no suit was pending; and while this case is
disapproved in Rex v. J'e8trymen of St. Harlebone, 5 Ad. & E.
268, and overruled in Rex v. Justices of Staffordshire, 6 Id. 84,
yet in neither case is it suggested that it was erroneous because no
action had been brought. This disapprobation turns upon the
principle that the ratepayers had no interest to be subserved by the
inspection, since no information to be obtained from the documents
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could aid them in the enforcement or protection of any lawful claim ;
Lord DENMAN saying, in the case last cited, that the subject-mattcr
was not one which the ratepayer could bring before the court as a
litigant, and hence there was not that direct and tangible interest
which is necessary to, bring persons within the rule on which the
courts act in granting inspection of public documents. In Rex v.
Merchant Tailors' Co., 2 B. & Ad. 115, although a mandamus was
refused to members of the company seeking inspection of all the
records, books, papers and muniments of the company, because of
the generality of the application, it was conceded by all the judges
that if the application had been limited to some legitimate and particular purpose in respect of which the examination became neces
sary, it would have been allowed, and there was no rule that to
warrant an order to inspect corporation documents there must actually have been a suit instituted.
It seems, therefore, to be sufficient if the person seeking inspection has such an interest in a specific controversy as will enable
him to maintain or defend an action, for which the public documents will furnish competent evidence or necessary information.
Nor is it essential that his interest should be private, capable of
sustaining a suit or defence on his own personal behalf. It will
justify his demand for inspection, if he may act in such suit as a
representative of a common or public right. The cases in England.
in which a private subject has secured inspection of public or quasz
public documents on the ground of being such a representative, are
comparatively rare, because of the prevalence of the rule that the
civil remedy for wrongs by which no private rights were peculiarly
affected, was usually in the name of the attorney-general, acting on
behalf of the public. But whenever the subject was, by reason of
his relation to the common interest, permitted to litigate for its protection, the right of inspection was fully secured to him. Thus, in
Rex v. Shelley, 3 T. R. 141, where some of the burgage tenants
were testing by quo warranto the right of the defendant to be a
burgess, a full inspection of the court-rolls, not limited to the
evidence of their own titles, was granted them. In Rex v. Babb. 3
T. R. 579, on an information by three aldermen to inquire into the
right of Woolmer to be mayor of Great Grimsby, the relators had "a
rule for the inspection and copies of all the public books, records
and papers of the borough of Great Grimsby regarding the subject
in dispute. And in the cases of Rex v. Justices of Leicester, Rex
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v. Xfarylebone, Rex v. Justices of Staffordh'ire, and Rex v. Mer.
chant Tailors' Co., already cited, the applicants for inspection had no
ither interest in the matters involved than such as they shared in
common with all the rate-payers of the parish or members of the corporation, but that was not even- suggested as a ground for refusing
the mandamus.
And indeed, upon the reason of the thing, if inspection of public
documents will be granted to a private individual when he is seeking merely the furtherance of his own private ends, a fortiori should
it be accorded to him when he is aiming at the accomplishment of
a public purpose, as to which the courts will assist his design through
a suit instituted by him in the public behalf.
If, therefore, we would recognise the right of the applicant to
maintain a suit on behalf of the public, because of any such violation of or non-compliance with the charter on the part of the
collector of taxes, as the relator seeks to discover through the
inspection desired, then we should also recognise his right to the
inspection, and enforce it by proper process.
The English rule, that the redress of wrongs arising from usurpations and unlawful acts of public officers, which do not directly
affect private persons or property, must be attained through the
suit of the attorney-general, has not been generally followed in the
practice of this state. Indeed it is not uniformly observed in
the mother country. Judge COWE N, in People v. Collins, 19
Wend. 56, refers to several instances of its infringement. Naturally, from the more democratic character of our institutions, greater
relaxation of the rule would be likely to obtain among us; and
accordingly we find that from an early period our courts have exercised a large discretion in annulling the illegal acts of municipal
bodies and officers, and compelling the performance of their public
duties at the instance of citizens and taxpayers who were not other
wise interested in the controversy than was the rest of the community, while the cases in which the attorney-general has interfered
for such purposes are quite infrequent. In State, Kean, pros., V.
Bronson, 6 Vroom 468, it is said that in this state the rule is modified only to the extent that a taxpayer may bring into question the
action of municipal authorities, if such action will subject him to a
tax in common with his fellow-citizens; and in State, i1lontgomer ,
1
pros., v. Trenton, 7 Vroom 79, this limit of modification was
adopted by a refusal of the court to set aside, at the instance of
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landowners in the neighborhood, an illegal ordinance granting permission to lay a railroad across a street. Undoubtedly most of the
cases where private citizens have sued to prevent or redress public
wrongs of municipal authorities, are those involving conduct which
would lead to expenditure of public moneys, and so increase taxation, but this has arisen rather from the usual character of such
wrongs than from any reason upon which a remedy would be
afforded. There are certainly instances of interference by the
courts with official action affecting only public rights at the suit of
private persons, where questions of taxation were not at all concerned, or were so remote from the matters complained of as not to
be noticed in the decision.
Thus, in State v. Justices of 3liddlesex, Coxe 244 (1794), the
Supreme Court, on a certiorariprosecuted by some inhabitants of
the county, set aside an election to fix a site for building a county
court house,-when the sole ground of complaint was unfairness in
conducting the election. In State v. New Brunswick, Coxe 393,
(1795), the court allowed a certiorarito test the validity of a muni.cipal ordinance, at the instance of a citizen, without proof that he
was or would be peculiarly affected by it. In State v. Griscorn et
al., 3 Halst. 136 (1825), a mandamus was granted to a private
applicant, directing a township committee to assign to the overseers
of highways in the township, their several divisions of a public
road then recently laid out; and in State v. Holliday, 3 Ialst
205, the same relator obtained a writ directing the overseer to
whom the road had then been assigned to open it for public use.
In State v. Snedeker, 1 Vroom 80 (1862), a citizen sued out a
certiorarito set aside the action of surveyors vacating a highway,
and "VREDENBURGH, J., said: "Every citizen is interested more or
less, in every highway, and has a right to submit any questions
affecting such interests to the court." In State v. Common
Council of Rahway,4 Vroom 110 (1868), the council was ordered
to appoint a special election to fill
a vacancy in the board, on a
mandamus issued at the relation of a resident of the ward unrepresented. In State ex rel. i2lfitehell v. Tolan, 4 Vroom 195, it was
decided that an inhabitant of a city has sufficient interest to support
the right to file an information in the nature of quo warranto,testing the legality of an election of aldermen.
These cases seem to indicate that with us the exception to the
rule is extended so far as to justify this court in acting by manda-
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mus, certiorarior quo warranto, at the instance of private persons,
for the redress or prevention of public wrongs by public bodies and
officers, whose official sphere is confined to some political division
of the state, whenever the applicant is one of the class of persons
to be most directly affected in their enjoyment of public rights, and
the public convenience will be subserved by the remedy desired.
The general indifference of private individuals to public omissions
and encroachments, the fear of expense in unsuccessful and even in
successful litigation, and the discretion of the court, have been, and
doubtless will continue to be, a sufficient guard to these public officials against too numerous and unreasonable attacks.
The present controversy relates to a matter of public police of
universally recognised importance, concerning a traffic which, in
the opinion of many, largely adds to the disorders of society and
the burdens of taxation; and it cannot be alleged that private interests are not as much involved in its due regulation by law as
they are in other public questions about which, heretofore indi.
viduals have maintained a standing in this court. Hence, I think
the relator, in his capacity of inhabitant and taxpayer in the city
of Orange, has such an interest in the proper observance of the
provisions of the city charter for licensing saloons, that he may,
under certain circumstances, litigate for its protection, and, in order
to ascertain whether those circumstances exist, being actuated by
such motives as are disclosed in the present application, he is
entitled to an inspection of the letters of recommendation filed with
the collector of taxes, upon which pending licenses were granted.
Let the mandamus prayed for be awarded.
The refusal of municipal as well as
private corporations to permit the inspection of their records has been a frequent

method adopted by the controlling element to delay or defeat the rights of
other corporators or individuals. Forttmately. however, an appeal to the law
has uniformly resulted in an affirmance
of the right in favor of any person interested in the subject-matter of the controversy, as affected hy a denial of the
right.
Judge DILLON, in his work on Municipal Corporations, states the following
points as having been ruled concerning
de right to inspect corporate documents

and papers: "Every corporator has a
right to inspect all the records, books
and other documents of the corporation
upon all proper occasions, and if, when
application for that purpose, the officer
who has their custody refuses to show
them, the court will grant a mandamus
to enforce his right. One who has a
prima facie title to a corporate office has
a right to inspect such documents at
relate to that title, and may obtain
mandamus for this purpose before any
suit has been instituted. A corporator
has a right to inspect the documents,
to obtain information as to his rights,
whether in dispute with a stranger or
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the corporation itself,
or any of its members:"
240; also 684. "In this
country the records, public books, and
by laws of municipal corporations, are
of a public nature, and if such a corporation should refuse to give inspection
thereof to any person having an interest
therein, or perhaps, for any proper purpose to any inhabitant of the corporation,
whether he had any special or private
interest or not, a writ of mandamus
would lie to command the corporation to
allow such inspection, and copies to be
taken, under reasonable precaution to
secure the safety of the originals."
So High, in his work on Extraordinary
Remedies, says,
83, "So this writ
(mandamus) will go commending a
recorder of deeds to permit access to his
books and records by a person properly
entitled thereto."

The register of the city and county of
New York, having as such the custody
of the records of conveyances in that
county and the indexes thereto, was in
the habit of charging a fee of five cents
as a condition upon which alone lie
would
allow any person to examine the indexes
to the records, and upon the plaintiffs
attempting to examine one of the indexes
without such payment, the register forcibly took it from him, and refused to
allow him to inspect it until such five
cents were paid. Thereupon the plaintiff paid this sum, and brought his
action to recover back the amount. The
Court of Common Pleas held in Townsend v. Dyckman, 2 E. D. Smith 224,
that no fees were allowed by law for a
search made by any other person than
the register himself and his assistants,
and that the plaintiff had a right to
make the examination desired without
any charge whatever; that the payment
was not a voluntary payment, but one
made under compulsion, and was an
abuse of official power, and consequently
affirmed the judgment of the court below
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for the plaintiff, with costs. The Supreme Court of thesame state also held
in Townshend v. The Register of Deeds
of New York, 7 Howard, 1Jrac. R. 318.
that any person, so desiring, bad the
right to examine the books of records
without charge, and that this should be
accorded not as a privilege, nor a favor,
but as a matter of absolute right.
The same court subsequently held in
The People v. Cornell, 47 Barb. 329,
that any member of a municipal corporation had the right, from the mere fact of
being a corporator, to a general inspection of the books and records of the
corporation, and to take copies thereof
without charge; and that the only restriction which the officers could make,
were to prescribe reasonable hours for
such inspection, and such reasonable
general rules as should be necessary to
preserve the records from loss or mutilation.
In Grcenl. on Bv.,
474, the rale is
laid down that the books of a corporation are public with respect to its mem
bers, butprivate with respect to strangers,
and that a rule for their inspection will
be granted, of course, on application of
a member, where such inspection is
shown to be necessary.
It is sometimes contended that although the records of deeds, mortgages,
&c, are public records, and as such,
open to inspection, yet, the indexes
thereto are not, and that the authorities
may therefore establish conditions to
their examination. Such a dainm does
not, however, appear to be sustained by
any statute or reported decision, but on
the contrary, the uniform principle ap
pears to be that all books which the
recorder is by law required to keep are
necessarily public records, and as such,
are open to public inspection.
JosiAH H. BissELL.
Chicago, February 1880.
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Supreme Court of the United States.
A'NNIE HOUGH v. TIE TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.
The general rule exempting the common master from liability to one servant fos
injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant considered and recognised.
But to that rule there are numerous well-defined exceptions, one of which arises
'rom the obligation of the master, whether a natural person or corporation, not to
!xpose the servant, when conducting the master's business, to perils or hazards
against which he may be guarded by proper diligence upon the part of the master.
To that end the master, whether a natural person or a corporation, although not
to be held as guaranteeing the absolute safety or perfection of machinery or other
apparatus provided for the servant, is bound to observe all the care which the exigencies of the situation reasonably require, in furnishing instrumentalities adequately
safe for use.
Those, at least, in the organization of a railroad corporation who are invested with
controlling or superior duty in that regard, represent its personality; their negligence,
from which injury results, is the negligence of the corporation.
If the servant, having knowledge of a defect in machinery, gives notice thereof to
.,he proper officer, and is promised that such defect shall be reinedied, his subsequent
use of the machinery, in the belief, well-grounded, that it will be put in proper condition within a reasonable time, does not necessarily, or as matter of law, make him
guilty of contributory negligence. It is for the jury to say whether he was in the
exercise of due care in relying upon such promise, and in using the machinery after
knowledge of its defective or insufficient condition. The burden of proof, in such
a case, is upon the company to show contributory negligence.

Ix error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas.
Action by plaintiffs in error, the widow and child of W. C. Hough,
for damages on account of his death, Which occurred in 1874, while
he was in the employment of defendant as an engineer.
The evidence in behalf of the plaintiffs tended to show that the
engine of which deceased had charge, coming in contact with an
animal, was thrown from the track, over an embankment, whereby
the whistle, fastened to the boiler, was blown or knocked out, and,
from the opening thus made, hot water and steam issued, scalding
the deceased to death; that the engine was thrown from the track
because the cow-catcher or pilot was defective, and the whistle blown
or knocked out because it was insecurely fastened to the boiler; that
these defects were owing to the negligence of the company's mastermechanic, and of the foreman of the round-house at Marshall; that
to the former was committed the exclusive management of the motive power of defendant's line, with full control over all engineers,
and with unrestricted power to employ, direct, control and discharge
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them at pleasure; that all engineers were required to report, for
orders, to those officers, and, under their directions alone could
engines go out upon the road; that deceased knew of the defective
condition of the cow-catcher or pilot, and having complained thereof
to both the master-mechanic and foreman of the round-house, he
was promised a number of times that the defect should be remedied,
but such promises were not kept; that a new pilot was made, but,
by reason of the negligence of those officers, it was not put on the
engine.
The evidence, in behalf of the company, tended to show that the
engine was not defective; that due care had been exercised, as well
in its purchase as in the selection of the officers charged with the
duty of keeping it in proper condition; that the defective cow-catcher
or pilot was not the cause of the engine being thrown from the
track; that the whistle was securely fastened, and did not blow out,
but the cab being torn away, the safety-valve was opened, whereby
the deceased was scalded; that if any of the alleged defects existed,
it was because of the negligence of the master-mechanic and the
foreman of the round-bouse, for which negligence, the company
claimed, it was not responsible.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARLAN, J.-The principal question arising upon the assignments of error, requires the consideration, in some of its aspects,
of the general rule exempting the common inaster from liability to
one servant for injuries caused by the negligence of afellow-servant
in the same employment.
"The general rule," said Chief Justice SHAW in Farwell v.
Boston and Worcester Bailway Company, 4 Metc. 49, "resulting
from considerations as well of justice as of policy, is, that he who
engages in the employment of another for the performance of specified duties and services, for compensation, takes upon himself the
natural and ordinary risks and perils incident to the performance
of such services, and, in legal contemplation, the compensation is
adjusted accordingly. And we are not aware of any principle
which should except the perils arising from the carelessness and
negligence of those who are in the same employment. These are
perils which the servant is as likely to know, and against which he
can as effectually guard, as the master. They are perils incident to
the service, and which can be as distinctly foreseen and provided for
in the rate of compensation, as any other."

HOUGH v. TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.

To prevent misapprehension as to the scope of the decision, it
was deemed necessary, in a subsequent portion of his opinion, to
add: "We are far from intending to say that there are no implied
warranties and undertakings arising out of the relation of master
and servant. Whether, for instance, the employer would be responsible to an engineer for the loss arising from a defective or ill-constructed steam-engine; whether this would depend upon an implied
warranty of its goodness and sufficiency, or upon the fact of wilful
misconduct, or gross negligence on the part of the employer, if a
natural person, or of the superintendent or immediate representative and managing agent, in case of an incorporated company, are
questions on which we give no opinion."
As to the general doctrine, to which we have adverted, very little
conflict of opinion is to be found in the adjudged cases, where the
court has been at liberty to consider it upon principle, uncontrolled
by statutory regulations. The difficulty has been in the practical
application of the rule in the special circumstances of particular
cases. What are the natural and ordinary risks incident to the
work in which the servant engages-what are the perils which, in
legal contemplation, are presumed to be adjusted in the stipulated
compensation-who, within the true sense of the rule, or upor
grounds of public policy, are to be deemed fellow-servants in the
same common adventure or undertaking-are questions in reference
to which much contrariety of opinion exists in the courts of the
several states. Many of the cases are very wide apart in the solution of those questions.
It would far exceed the limits to be observed in this opinion, and
it is not essential in this case, to enter upon an elaborate or critical
review of the authorities upon those several points. Nor shall we
attempt to lay down any general rule applicable to all cases involving the liability of the common employer to one employee for the
negligence of a co-employee in the same service. It is sufficient to
say that, while the general doctrine, as stated by Chief Justice
SHAW, is sustained by elementary writers of high authority, and
by numerous adjudications of the American and English courts,
there are well-defined exceptions, which, resting, as they clearly do,
upon principles of justice, expediency and public policy, have
become too firmly established in our jurisprudence to be now dis.egarded or shaken.
One, and, perhaps, the most important of those exceptions arises
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from the obligation of the master, whether a natural person or a
corporate body, not to expose the servant, when conducting the
master's business, to perils or hazards against which he may be
guarded by proper diligence upon the part of the master. To that
end the master is bound to observe all the care which prudence and
the exigencies of the situation require, in providing the servant
with machinery or other instrumentalities, adequately safe for use
by the latter. It is implied in the contract between the parties
that the servant risks the dangers which ordinarily attend or are
incident to the business in which he voluntarily engages for compensation; among which is the carelessness of those, at least, in the
same work or employment, with whose habits, conduct and capacity
he has, in the course of his duties, an opportunity to become
acquainted, and against whose neglect or incompetency he may
himself take such precautions as his inclination or judgment may
suggest. But it is equally implied in the same contract that the
master shall supply the physical means and agencies for the conduct
of the business. It is also implied, and public policy requires,
that, in selecting such means, he shall not be wanting in proper
care. His negligence in that regard, is not a hazard, usually or
necessarily attendant upon the business. Nor is it one which the
servant, in legal contemplation, is presumed to risk, for the obvious
reason that the servant who is to use the instrumentalities provided
by the master, has, ordinarily, no connection with their purchase
in the first instance, or with their preservation or maintenance, in
suitable condition, after they have been supplied by the master.
In considering what dangers the servant is presumed to risk, the
court, in Railroad Go. v. -ort, 17 Wall. 557, said: "But this presumption cannot arise where the risk is not within the contract of
service, and the servant had no reason to believe he would have to
encounter it. If it were otherwise, principals would be released
from all obligations to make reparations to an employee in a subordinate position for any injury caused by the wrongful conduct of
the persons placed over him, whether they were fellow-servants in
the same common service or not. Such a doctrine would be subversive of all just ideas of the obligations arising out of the contract
of service, and withdraw all protection from the subordinate employees of railroad corporations. These corporations, instead of
being required to conduct their business so as not to endanger life,
would, so far as this class of persons were concerned, be relieved
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of all pecuniary responsibility in case they failed to do it. A doe
trine that leads to such results is unsupported by reason and cannot
receive our sanction."
A railroad corporation may be controlled by competent, watchful
and prudent directors, who exercise the greatest caution in the
selection of a superintendent or general manager, under whose
supervision and orders its affairs and business, in all of its departments, are conducted. The latter, in turn, may observe the same
caution in the appointment of subordinates at the head of the
several branches or departipents of the company's service. But
the obligation still remains to provide and maintain, in suitable
condition, the machinery and apparatus to be used by its employees
-an obligation the more important, and the degree of diligence in
its performance the greater, in proportion to the dangers which
may be encountered. Those, at least, in the organization of the
corporation, who are invested with controlling or superior authority
in that regard, represent its personality; their negligence, from
which injury results, is the negligence of the corporation. The
latter cannot, in respect of such matters, interpose between it and
the servant who has been injured, without fault on his part, the
personal responsibility of an agent who, in exercising the master's
authority, has violated the duty he owes, as well to the servant as
to the corporation.
To guard against misapplication of these principles we should
say that the corporation is not to be held as guaranteeing or warranting the absolute safety, under all circumstances, or the perfection in all of its parts, .of the machinery or apparatus which may
be provided for the use of employees. Its duty, in that respect, to
its employees is discharged when, but only when, its agents whose
business it is to supply such instrumentalities, exercise due care as
well in their purchase originally, as in keeping and maintaining
them ijn
such condition as to be reasonably and adequately safe for
use by employees.
The principles we have announced are sustained by the great
weight of authority in this country, as an examination of adjudged
cases and elementary treatises will abundantly show.
A leading case is Ford v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 110 Mass.
241. That was an action by an engineer to recover damages for
injuries caused by the explosion of his engine, which was old and
out of repair. His right to recover was disputed upon the ground
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that the want of repair of the engine was due to the negligence of
fellow-servants in the department of repairs.
But the court said: "The rule of law which exempted the
master from responsibility to the servant for injuries received from
the ordinary risks of his employment, including the negligence of
his fellow-servants, does not excuse the exercise of ordinary care
in supplying and maintaining proper instrumentalities for the performance of the work required. One who enters the employment
of another has a right to count on this duty, and is not required to
assume the risks of the master's negligence in this respect. The
fact that it is a duty which must always be discharged, when the
employer is a corporation, by officers and agents, does not relieve
the corporation from that obligation. The agents who are charged
with the duty of supplying safe machinery are not, in the true
sense of the rule relied on, to be regarded as fellow-servants of
those who are engaged in operating it. They are charged with the
master's duty to his servant. They are employed in distinct and
independent departments of service, and there is no difficulty in
distinguishing them, even when the same person renders service by
turns in each, as the convenience of the employer may require."
In a subsequent portion of the same opinion, the court said: "The
corporation is equally chargeable, whether the negligence was in
originally failing to provide or in afterwards failing to keep its
machinery in safe condition."
The same views, substantially, are expressed by' Mr. Wharton in
his Treatise on the Law of Negligence. The author (§211) says:
"The question is that of duty; and without making the unnecessary and inadequate assumption of implied warranty, it is sufficient
for the purposes of justice to assert that it is the duty of an em
ployer, inviting employees to use his structure and machinery, t,
use proper care and diligence to make such structure and machinery
fit for use." Again (§ 212): "At the same time we must remember
that where a master personally, or through his representatives, exercises due care in the purchase or construction of buildings and nrachinery, and in their repair, he cannot be made liable for injuries
which arise from casualties against which such care would not protect. It is otherwise if there be a lack in such care, either by himself or his representatives. The duty of repairing is his own; and,
as we shall hereafter see, the better opinion is, that he is directly
liable for the negligence of agents when acting in this respect in his
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behalf. If the master 'knows, or, in the exercise of due care,
might have known, that * * * his structures or engines were insufficient, either at the time of procuring them, or at any subsequent
time, he fails in his duty.' " Still further, in reference to the obligation upon the master to supply suitable machinery for working
use (§ 232, a): "It has sometimes been said that a corporation is
obliged to act always by servants, and that it is unjust to impute to
it personal negligence in cases in which it is impossible for it to be
negligent personally. But if this be true, it would relieve corporations from all liability to servants. The true view is, that, as the
corporation can act only through superintending officers, the negligences of those officers, in respect to other servants, are the negligences of the corporation."
The current of decisions in this country is in the same directiofi,
as will be seen from an examination of the authorities, some of
which are cited in the note at the end of this opinion.
It is, however, insisted that the defence is sustained by the settled course of decisions in the English courts. It is undoubtedly
true that the general doctrine of the immunity of the master from
responsibility for injuries received by his servant from a fellowservant in the same employment, has, in some cases, been carried
much further by the English, than by the American, courts. Hut
we cannot see that, upon the precise question we have been considering, there is any substantial conflict between them. That question was not, as is supposed, involved, it certainly was not decided,
in Priestleyv. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1. The decision there was placed
by Lord ABINGER partly upon the ground that in the "sort of employment especially described in the declaration [transporting goods
of the master by one servant, in a van, conducted by another of his
servants], * * * the plaintiff must have known as well as the
master, and probably better, whether the van was sufficient, whether
it was overloaded, and whether it was likely to carry him safely."
But even in that case, although the court declared it was not called
upon to decide how far knowledge, upon the part of the master, of
vices or imperfections in the carriage used by the servant injured
would make him liable, it was said: " H e (the master) is, no doubt,
bound to provide for the safety of the servant in the cours, of his
employment, to the best of his judgment, information and belief."
The question came before the House of Lords in Paterson v
Wallace, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 748, and again, in 1858, in Bar
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tonshill Coat Co. v. Reid, 3 Id. 288. In the last-named case,
Lord CRANWORTH said that it was a principle, established by many
preceding cases, "that when a master employs his servant in a work
of danger he is bound to exercise due care in order to have his tackle
and machinery in a safe and proper condition, so as to protect the
servant against unnecessary risks." This he held to be the law in
both Scotland and England. At the same sitting of the House of
Lords, Bartonshill Coal Go. v. McGuire, 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 807,
was determined. In that case, Lord Chancellor CHELMSFORD
delivered the principal opinion, concurring in.what was said in the
Reid case. After referring to the general doctrine, as announced
in Priestly v. Fowler, and recognised subsequently in other cases
in the English courts, he said: "In the consideration of these
cases it did not become necessary to define with any great precision
what was meant by the words ' common service' or ' common employment,' and perhaps it might be difficult beforehand to suggest
any exact definition of them. It is necessary, however, in each
particular case to ascertain whether the fellow-servants are fellowlaborers in the same work, because, although a servant may be
taken to have engaged to encounter all risks which are incident to
the service which he undertakes, yet he cannot be expected to anticipate those which may happen to him on occasions foreign to his
employment. Where servants, therefore, are engaged in different
departments of duty, an injury committed by one servant upon the
other, by carelessness or negligence in the course of his peculiar
work, ihnot within the exception, nd the master's liability attaches
in that case in the same manner as if the injured servant stood in
no such relation to him."
Upon the same occasion, Lord BROUGHAM, referring to the remark of a Scotch judge to the effect that an absolute and inflexible
rule, releasing the master from responsibility in every case where
one servant is injured by the fault of another, was utterly unknown
to the law of Scotland, said: "1But, my lords, it is utterly unknown
to the laws of England also. To bring the case within the exemption there must be this most material qualification, that the two servants shall be men in the same common employment, and engaged
in the same common work under that employment :" 3 Id. 313.
An instructive case is Clarke v. Holmes, decided in 1862, in the
Exchequer Chamber, upon appeal from the Court of Exchequer, 7
H. & N. 937. There the plaintiff was employed by the defendant
VOL. XXVII.-22
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to oil dangerous machinery, and he was injured in consequence of
its remaining unfenced. He had complained of the condition of
the machinery, and the manager of the defendant, in the latter's
presence, promised that the fencing should be restored. In the
course of the argument counsel for the defendant relied upon
Priestly v. -owler, claiming it to have decided, that whenever a
servant accepts a dangerous occupation he must bear the risk. He
was, however, interrupted by

COCKBURN,

C. J., with the remark:

"That is, whatever is fairly within the scope of the occupation, including the negligence of fellow-servants; here it is the negligence
of the master." CROMPTON, J., also said: "It cannot be made
part of the contract, that the master shall not be liable for his own
negligence."
In the opinion delivered by COCKBURN, C. J., it was said: "I
concider the doctrine laid down by the House of Lords, in the case
of The Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, as the law of Scotland with
reference to the duty of a master, as applicable to the law of England also, namely, that when a servant is employed on machinery
from the use of which danger may arise, it is the duty of the master
to take due care, and to use all reasonable means, to guard against
and prevent any defects from which increased and unnecessary danger may occur." Again, in the same opinion: "The rule I am
laying down goes only to this, that the danger contemplated on
entering into the contract, shall not be aggravated by any omission
on the part of the master to keep the machinery in the condition
in which, from the terms of the contract, or the nature of the employment, the servant had a right to expect that it would be kept."
BYLES, J. : " But I think the master liable on the broader ground,
to wit, that the owner of dangerous machinery is bound to exercise
due care that it is in a safe and proper condition. * * * The master is neither, on the one hand, at liberty to neglect all care, nor,
on the other, is he to insure safety, but he is to use due and reasonable care. * * * Why may not the master be guilty of negligence,
by his manager, or agent, whose employment may be so distinct
from that of the injured servant that they cannot with propriety be
deemed fellow-servants? And if a master's personal knowledge of
defects in his machinery be necessary to his liability, the more a
master neglects his business and abandons it to others the less will
he be liable."
To the same effect is the recent case of Mlurphy v. Phillips, de-
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cided in 1876 in the Exchequer Division of the High Court of Justice, 35 Law Times Rep. 477.
It is scarcely necessary to say that the jury were not correctly
informed by the court below as to the legal principles governing
this case. It is impossible to reconcile the general charge, or the
specific instructions, with the rules which we have laid down. They
were, taken together, equivalent to a peremptory instruction to find
for the company. The jury may have believed, from the evidence,
that the defects complained of constituted the efficient proximate
cause of the death of the engineer; that such defects would not
have existed had the master mechanic and foreman of the roundhouse exercised reasonable care and diligence in the discharge of
their respective duties touching the machinery and physical appliances supplied to employees engaged in running trains; and that
the deceased was not chargeable with contributory negligence; yet,
consistently with any fair interpretation of the charge, and the
specific instructions, they were precluded from finding a verdict
against the company
One other question, arising upon the instructions, and which has
been discussed with some fulness by counsel, deserves notice at our
hands. It is contended by counsel that the engineer was guilty of
such contributory negligence as to prevent the plaintiffs from recovering. The instruction upon that branch of the case was misleading and erroneous.
The defect in the engine, of which the engineer had knowledge,
was that which existed in the cow-catcher or pilot. It is not claimed
that he was aware of the insufficient fastening of the whistle, or that
the defect, if any, in that respect, was of such a character that he
should have become advised of it while using the engine on the
road. But he did have knowledge of the defective condition of the
cow-catcher or pilot, and complained thereof to both the mastermechanic and the foreman of the round-house. They promised that
it should be promptly remedied, and it may be that be continued to
use the engine in the belief that the defect would be removed.
The court below seem to attach no consequence to the complaint
made by the engineer, followed, as it was, by explicit assurances
that the defect should be remedied. According to the instructions,
if the engineer used the engine with knowledge of the defect, the
jury should find for the company, although he may have been justified in relying upon those assurances.
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If the engineer, after discovering or recognising the defective con
dition of the cow-catcher or pilot, had continued to use the engine,
without giving notice thereof to the proper officers of the company,
he would undoubtedly have been guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar a recovery, so far as such defect was found to have
been the efficient cause of the death. He would be held, in that
case, to have himself risked the dangers which might result from
the use of the engine in such defective condition. But "there can
be no doubt that, where a master has expressly promised to repair
a defect, the servant can recover for an injury caused thereby,
within such a period of time after the promise as would be reasonable to allow for its performance, and, as we think, for an injury
suffered within any period which would not preclude all reasonable
expectation that the promise might be kept:" Sherm. & Red. on
Neg., § 96 ; Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 38 ; Patterson
v. P. & C. B. V. Co., 76 Penn. St. 389; Le Clair v. Railroad
Co., 20 Minn. 9; Brabbits v. B. TV. Co., 38 Mo. 289; Ford v.
Fitchburg Railroad Co., 110 Mass. 241. " If the servant," says
Mr. Cooley in his work on Torts 599, "having a right to abandon
the service because it is dangerous, refrains from doing so in consequence of assurances that the danger shall be removed, the duty
ro remove the danger is manifest and imperative, and the master
is not in the exercise of ordinary care unless or until he makes
his assurances good. Moreover, the assurances remove all ground
for the argument that the servant, by continuing the employment,
engages to assume the risk."
And such seems to be the rule recognised in the English courts:
Holmes v. Worthington, 2 Fos. & Fin. 535; H7olmes v. Clarke, 6
Hurlst. & N. 349; Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Id. 942. We may add
that it was for the jury to say whether the defect in the cow-catcher
or pilot was such that none but a reckless engineer, utterly careless
of his safety, would have used the engine without it being removed.
If, under all the circumstances, and in view of the promise to remedy
the defect, the engineer was not wanting in due care in continuing to
use the engine, then the company will not be excused for the omission to supply proper machinery upon the ground of contributory
negligence. That the engineer knew of the alleged defect was not,
under the circumstances, and as matter of law, absolutely conclusive
of want of due care on his part: 110 Mass.- 261; Lanning v. N.
Y. Cent. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 521. In such a case as that
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here presented, the burden of proof to show contributory negligence
was upon the defendant: Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. 401;
Wharton's Law of Negligence, § 423, and authorities there cited in
note 1 ; 93 U. S. 291.
Our attention has been called to two cases determined in the
Supreme Court of Texas, and which it is urged, sustain the principles announced in the court below. After a careful consideration
of those cases we are of opiniou that they do not necessarily conflict
with the conclusions we have reached. Be this as it may, the questions before us, in the absence of positive statute, depeni upon
principles of general law, and, in their determination, we are not
required to follow the decisions of the state courts.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to set aside the verdict and award a new trial, and for such
other proceedings as may be consistent with this opinion.'

United States Circuit Court. -Distriatof

h2"diana.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. AMERICAN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. ET AL.
Since the Act of Congress of July 24th 1866 (Rev. Stat. 5263), u railroad cannot grant to a telegraph company the sole right to construct a line over its right f
way so as to exclude other telegraph companies who have accepted the provisions
of said Act of Congress, and whose lines would not disturb or obstruct the business
of the company to whom the use has first been granted.
A telegraph company having a grant from a railroad of such exclusive right to
construct a line along the right of way is entitled to an injunction against actual
interference with its line, but not against such interruption of its business as results
from mere competition by other companies constructing rival lines along said
railroad.

THIS was a motion for an injunction against the American Union
I Booth v. Boston {¢ Albany Railroad Co., 73 N. Y. 40 ; Lanning v. N. Y. C. Rail.
road Co., 49 Id. 530; Flike v. Boston 4- Albany Railroad Co., 53 Id. 549 ; Corco
ran v. Holbrook, 59 Id. 517 ; Gilinan v. Eastern Railroad Co., 13 Allen 43
Buzzeti v. Loconia ManuaclturingCo., 48 Me. 116; Shanny v. Androscoggin .3ills,
66 Id. 425 ; Dillon v. Union PacifirRailroad Co., 3 Dill. 321 ; Chicago 4- Northwestern Railroad Co. v. .Jackson, 50 Ill. 492 ; Chicago 4- Northwestern Rilroad C.
v. Swprt. 45 Id. 197 ; Chicaqo and Northwestern Rai!road Co. v. Montfbrt, 60 Id.
175; Snow v. Hou.atonic Railroad Co., 8 Allen 441 ; Busby v. Flolthaui, 46 Mo.
161 ; Naslville 6- Chattanooga Railroad Co. v. Elliott, I Coldw. 613; Tfu'lan v.
Phila. 4- Southern Mail Steamship Co., 78 Penn. St. 32 ; Brabbits v. Chicago 4
Northwestern, Railroad Co., 38 Wis. 293; Kielley v. Belcher Silver 0Mining Co., 3
Saw. 444; Whart. Law of Neg., 2d ed., J 199 to 242, and notes.
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and Central Union Telegraph Companies and the Wabash Railway
Company, to restrain the construction of the lines of the American
Union Telegraph Company along the right of way of the Wabash
Railway Company, upon the ground that the railway company, by
a contract made in 1870, had granted to the complainant, the
Western Union Telegraph Company, the exclusive right to construct a line along said right of way.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARLAN, Circuit Justice.-I am of the opinion: First. That
the Wabash Railway Company, by its numerous acts of ratification
subsequent to its organization, became bound by the contract of
May 2d 1870, as fully as the Toledo, Wabash & Western Railway
Company would be if it were in existence and operating the lines
6f railway in question.
Second. Notwithstanding the relations which some of the promoters of the American Union Telegraph Company hold to the
Wabash Railway Company, the former must be regarded in this
suit as an entirely distinct corporation, duly organized under the
laws of Indiana, with power to construct and operate lines of
telegraph in that state.
Third. It was competent for the railway company which entered
into the contract of 1870, to grant to the Western Union Telegraph
Company the privilege, for a term of years, of using its right of
way for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating
lines of telegraph.
Fourth. But consistently with the provisions of the Act of Congress approved July 24th 1866, and with the principles announced
in the case of Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Vnion Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. 16, the railway company could not, by contract, put it in the power of the Western Union Telegraph Company to exclude from such right of way other telegraph companies,
which like the Western Union Telegraph Company accepted the
provisions of the said Act of 1866, and whose lines when constructed and in operation would not disturb the possession or materially obstruct the operation of the lines of that company. The
defendant railway company interposes no objection to the occupancy of its right of way by the American Union Telegraph Company; on the contrary, it has assented thereto and waived, or does
not demand, compensation therefor. It was unnecessary, therefore, to institute the proceedings against the railway company to
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condemn its right of way for telegraph purposes. I am satisfied
that the new line can be constructed and operated on the railroad
company's right of way without interfering with ordinary travel
thereon, and without substantially interfering with the successful
operation of any lines which complainant has erected or is likely to
erect, or need, on and over the same right of way. The complain
ant is entitled to full protection against interference with the use
of its lines, but it is not entitled to be protected by injunction in
the exclusive use of the railway company's right of way assumed
to be granted by the contract of 1870, contrary, as I think, to the
public policy declared in the Act of Congress and in the foregoing
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. It may be
true that the defendant railway company has violated the terms of
the contract of 1870 by voluntarily assenting to the use of its
right of way by the American Union Telegraph Company without
compensation. Still the court cannot make that violation the basis
of an injunction against the new company, without putting it in
the power of railway companies operating the post-roads of the
United States, by private agreement with a telegraph company, to
defeat the purposes of the Act of 1866, which was to make the
erection of telegraph lines on the post-roads of the United States
(the consent of the owners of the right of way being obtained, or
such right of way being condemned for telegraph purposes and compensation therefor made), free to all corporations, submitting to the
conditions imposed by Congress, even against hostile state legislation. If, in such cases, state legislation cannot prevent the occupancy of post-roads for telegraphic purposes, by such corporations
as are willing to avail themselves of the Act of Congress, much less
could such results be rightfully obtained through private contracts
of corporations. Complainant may have an injunction against all
interference with the operation and use by it 6f its present lines of
telegraph, upon and along the roads of the defendant railway company, other than such interference as may arise or result from mere
business competition with other companies constructing rival lines;
and fiurther orders will, in that event, be made during the pendency
of this suit, as may be necessary to prevent such interference, but
the application for an injunction to prevent the construction and
operation by the defendant telegraph company and all lines of
telegraph whatever, upon such right of way, is denied. Such ordei
will be entered as may be consistent with what is here said.

CUTTING v. MARLOR.

Court of Appeals of New York.
ROBERT L. CUTTING, JR., RECEIVER, &c., v. THOMAS S. MARLOR.
A banking association which holds securities as collaterals for loans is a bailee
for value, and liable for the fraudulent conversion of those securities by its officerg,
when the opportunity for such conversion was obtained through the want of ordinary care and vigilance on the part of the trustees
It is the duty of such an association not only to employ officers of good character
but also to exercise such supervision and vigilance as will reasonably protect property
intrusted to its safe keeping from misapplication by such officers.

THTs was an action by the receiver of the Bankers' and Brokers'
Association to recover from defendant $6000, loaned to him by the
association. Defendant admitted the loan but showed that he had
deposited with the association as collateral security certain railroad
bonds and bank stocks; that before the commencement of this
action he had tendered to plaintiff the amount of the loan and
demanded the return of the collaterals, and that plaintiff had replied
that he was unable to return the same. It appeared that one Bonner, the president of the association, had taken these collaterals,
pledged them to third persons for his own debts, and subsequently
absconded. It further appeared that the management of the association was, by its charter, committed to thirteen trustees who, by
the by-laws, were required to hold monthly meetings; that its property and securities were in charge of a manager, one Oley, who
was also one of the trustees; that the president, Bonner, who was
a broker and a large borrower of money, and who up to the time
of his default had borne a good character, had been for six months
prior to his default accustomed to send to the office of the association, and against the objection of the manager, take away and use
its securities, returning such of them as from time to time would be
sent for by the manager. In this way the defendant's property
had been taken. It also appeared that the trustees did not hold
meetings as provided by the by-laws, made no periodical examination of the securities, and did not take any substantial oversight of
the affairs of the association or any measures for the. safe custody
of its property. The court below, VAN VORST, J., held that the
association was liable for the acts of Bonner in converting the securities, and that defendant might set off their value in this action.
The plaintiffs appealed.
Gra

Davenport and John MeKeon, for appellant.
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Arnoux, Ritch and Woodford, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHURCH, 0. J.-We have carefully examined the questions involved and the authorities cited, and we do not deem it necessary
to enter into an elaborate discussion of them. We concur with the
result arrived at by the trial judge, that upoh his findings of fact
the corporation is liable for the conversion of the securities in question, and we concur mainly with his opinion. He finds, among
other things, that the trustees left the entire management of the
association with the president and one Oley, who was styled manager and who was also a trustee; that the trustees took the statement of Bonner without question or examination; that the securities were taken from the bank without objection or resistance on
the part of the trustees or the officers of the institution ; that no
meetings of the trustees were held pursuant to the by-laws: that no
examination was made by the trustees of the securities, and no care
or vigilance was used by them in respect to such securities. It also
appears that the president had been in the habit of abstracting
securities and using them in his private business for six months prior
to the failure of the bank, but that most of the securities had been
returned to the bank when called for; that Oley, the manager, bad
knowledge of this habit of the president, and took no means to prevent it or notify the other trustees.
The bailment was for the mutual benefit of both parties, and in
such a case the bailee is bound to exercise ordinary care at least;
and in determining what constitutes such care, the nature and value
of the property and the means of protection possessed by the bailee
and the relation of the parties and other circumstances must be considered.
The securities were negotiable and valuable, and the corporation
possessed ample means of keeping them safely and securely. Besides, the association was under an implied obligation or contract by
the transaction itself to return the securities to the defendant when
the debt was paid. The failure to do so rendered the corporation
presumptively liable for conversion. The onus was upon it to relieve
itself from that liability: Story on Bailments, § 339.
The trial judge has found expressly that the association did not
exercise reasonable diligence in respect to the care and custody of
these securities, and we think that the evidence fully justified the
finding. The authorities relied upon by the plaintiff's counsel are
VOL. XXVIII.-23
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not applicable to the facts found in this case. Fosterv. Essex Bank,
17 Mass. 478, was the case of gratuitous bailment upon a special
deposit of a quantity of gold. The rule of liability in such a case
is quite different and is condensed in the syllabus as follows: "A
mere depositary, without any special undertaking, and without
reward, is not answerable for the loss of the goods deposited, but in
case of gross negligence, which is equivalent to fraud in its effect
upon contracts." No fault or negligence was shown on the part of
the bank. The gold was feloniously taken by the cashier. In Jenkins v. Bank of Bowdoinham, 58 Me. 275, the only question decided was, whether the receipt stating that the securities were to be
returned upon the payment of the debt increased the common-law
liability of the bank, and it was held that it did not. In that case
the securities were stolen by a burglar and the action was not
based upon fault or negligence.
Giblin v. Afeillullin, Law Rep. 2 P. C. Cases 318, was like the
case of Foster v. Essex Bank, supra, which it cites, and the point
of the decision is that a depositary of a special deposit is not liable
for the felony of an employee, without fault on his part.
Scott v. Bank of Cherry Valley, 17 Penn. St. 471, holds the
same doctrine.
These are the principal authorities relied upon by the plaintiff.
It will be observed that Fosterv. Essex Bank; Giblin v. AciIullin and Scott v. Cherry. Valley Bank, were cases of special deposit
without contract or reward. With the doctrine of these cases no
fault can be found. If a loss occurs even through the larceny of
agents or employees, the dopositary is not liable unless gross negligence is shown. This distinction between those cases and this is
manifest. The case was not a special deposit. The corporation
occupied at least the position of bailee for hire, and was under obligation to exercise at least ordinary care. The finding that such
care was not exercised was justified by the evidence. Bonner was
a notorious dealer and speculator in stocks. He had been engaged
for many months in abstracting securities held by the bank for his
private purposes, and he had done this not secretly, but openly and
publicly. The manager who was also a trustee, knew that these
acts were being done, and it is difficult to see why his knowledge
and neglect are not imputable to the corporation itself. If all the
trustees, or a majority, had known of these transactions, and had
not at once removed Bonner, or otherwise prevented their recur-

CUTTING v. MARLOR.

17U

rence, they would have been guilty of culpable
dereliction of duty.
& corporation is represented by its trustees
and managers. Their
acts are its acts and their neglect its neglect.
The employment of
agents of good character does not discharge
their whole duty. It is
misconduct not to do this, but in addition
they are required to exercise such supervision and vigilance as
a discreet person would
exercise over his own affairs. The bank
might not be liable for a
single act of fraud or crime on the part of an
officer or agent, while
it would be for a continuous course of fraudulent
practices, especially those so openly committed and easily
detected as these are
shown to have been. Here was no supervision,
no meetings, no
examination, no inquiry. There was actual
knowledge on the
part of the managing trustee, and his
silent objection without
adopting any measures of prevention, amounted
to acquiescence in
the wrong, and it would not be a strained inference
from the business of Bonner and the publicity of the
acts and other circumstances, that the other trustees either had
reason to suspect what
was going on, or if not they were grossly negligent
of their duties.
We concur with the learned trial judge, "that
a system of management of a banking-house in which such conduct
of its officers was
permitted, was a breach of duty, and grossly
negligent towards its
dealers and persons having stocks and bonds
in its keeping."
It is argued that the negligence shown was
not the proximate
cause of the loss, and that with the utmost
vigilance it would have
been possible for the president, who had access
to the vault, to have
abstracted the securities. This may be true,
but the position is not
tenable. The exercise of ordinary care would
have discovered the
wrongful practices, because they were not secret,
and were actually
known to the managing trustee, and if known
the trustees had the
power and it would have been their duty
to have effectually prevented it, and the presumption is that they
would have done so.
The negligence related to the cause of the
loss, viz. : the abstraction of collaterals for private use, which ordinary
vigilance would
have discovered and prevented.
This is unlike the negligence urged in Scott
v. Bank, supra.
There it seems that the teller's accounts were
fraudulently kept and
had been for two years, and the court held
that the bank owed no
duty to examine the teller's accounts for the
benefit of a gratuitous
special bailment. Here there was a duty
owing to the defendant
to safely keep the securities and the exercise
of care points directly
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to
to the prevention of the fraudulent acts of Bonner in respect
the
done
have
might
he
that
say
to
this duty. It is no answer
same secretly. It could as well be said that he might have done
it by a burglary or other crime. The point is whether care and
that
vigilance would have prevented what was done. It is said
robbed
been
also
have
this is a hard case for the stockholders, who
as to
by the acts of Bonner. This is doubtless true. It is a question
and
fraud
of
which among innocent persons is to bear the loss
their
chose
crime. The stockholders established an institution,
officers and invited the public to deal with them. The defendant
good
was a dealer and had a right to rely upon the vigilance and
manthe
faith of those whom the stockholders had intrusted with
misagement of the corporation, and while regretting the common
as proved
fortune, we think under the circumstances of this case
the posiprinciples
equitable
and
legal
upon
and found, that both
stockholders.
the
of
that
to
superior
is
tion of the defendant
The judgment must be affirmed.
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Where an offer has been made to a person who is expressly
as a letter containing an
authorized to accept such offer by post, then, as soon
acceptance is posted, correctly addressed to thl offerer, the contract is complete,
zven though such letter never reaches the offerer.
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LopEs, J.
THIS Was an appeal by defendant from the judgment of
(reported 40 Law Times Rep., N. S. 426).
The facts were that the defendant, on the 30th September 1874,
applied by letter for one hundred shares in the plaintiff company,
was
that the shares were allotted, and that an allotment letter
address
posted to him on the 20th October 1874, directed to the
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given by him. The defendant said that the allotment
letter had
never been received by him, and that he had heard nothing
of the
shares until March 1877, when he received a letter
demanding
95Z., the amount of a call on one hundred shares. This
the defendant refused to pay, denying that he was a shareholder,
and on that
the-action was brought by plaintiffs. The jury found
(1) that the
allotment letter of the 20th October 1874, had been
posted; and
(2) that the defendant had never received it. On these
findings,
LOPES, T., on consideration, gave judgment
for the plaintiffs.
THESIGER, L. J.-In this case the defendant
made an application for shares in the plaintiff company, under circumstances
from
which we must imply that he authorized the company,
in the event
of their allotting to him the shares applied for, to send
the notice
of allotment by post. The company did allot him the
shares, and
duly addressed to him and posted a letter containing the
notice of
allotment; but upon the finding of the jury, it must be
taken that
the letter never reached its destination. In this state
of circumstances, LoPEs, J., has decided that the defendant is
liable as a
shareholder. He based his decision mainly upon the
ground that
the point for his consideration was covered by authority
binding
upon him, and I am of opinion that he did so rightly,
and that it
is covered by authority equally binding upon this court.
-Dunlop
v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cas. 381, is of course the leading
case on the
subject. It is true that Lord COTTENHAN might have
decided
that case without deciding the point in this. But it appears
to me
equally true that he did not do so, and that he preferred
to rest,
and did rest, his judgment as to one of the matters
of exception
before him upon a principle which embraces and governs
the present case. If so, this court is as much bound to apply
that principle, constituting as it did a ratio decidendi, as it is to
follow the
decision itself. The exception was that the Lord Justice
General
directed the jury in point of law, that if the pursuers
posted their
acceptance of the offer according to the usages of trade,
they were
not responsible for any casualties in the post-office establishment.
This direction was wide enough in its terms to include
the case of
the acceptance never being delivered at all, and Lord COTTENIAM,
in expressing his opinion that it was not open to objection,
did so
after putting the case of a letter containing a notice
of dishonor
being posted to the holder of a bill of exchange in proper
time, in
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which case he said, at page 899, "Whether that letter be delivered
or not is a matter quite immaterial, because for accidents happening at the post-office he is not responsible."
In short, Lord COTTENHAm appears to me to have held, that as
a rule, a contract formed by correspondence through the post is complete as soon as the letter accepting an offer is put into the post,
and is not put an end to in the event of the letter never being
My view of the effect of Dunlop v. Higgins, supra, is
that taken by JAMES, L. J., in Harris's Case, Law Rep. 7 Ch. Ap.
delivered.

587, where, at p. 592, he speaks of the former case as "a case
which is binding upon everybody, and in which every principle
argued before us was discussed at length by the Lord Chancellor
in giving judgment, in which he (meaning the Lord Chancellor)"
arrived at the conclusion, that the posting of the letter of acceptance is the completion of the contract; that is to say, the moment
one man has made the offer and the other has done something binding himself to that offer, then the contract is complete, the instant of
completion being that in which the letter accepting the offer is
delivered to the post and neither party can afterwards escape from
it."

MNVELLISH, L. J., also took the same view.

He says (at p. 595),

"in Dunlop v. Higgins, the question was directly raised whether
the law was truly expounded in the case of Adams v. Lindsell,
1 B. & Ald. 681, and the House of Lords approved of the ruling
in that case. Lord Chancellor COTTENHAM said, in the course of
his judgment, that in the case of a bill of exchange, notice of dishonor given by putting a letter into the post at the right time had
been held quite sufficient, whether that letter was delivered or not,
and he referred to Stocken v. Collins, 7 M. & W. 515, on that
point, he being clearly of opinion that the rule as to accepting a
contract was exactly the same as the rule as to sending notice of
dishonor of a bill of exchange. He then referred to the case of
Adams v. Lindsell, supra, and quoted the observation of Lord
ELLENBOROUGH. That case, therefore, appears to me to be a direct
decision that the contract is made from the time when it is accepted
by post."
Leaving .arns's Case, for the moment, I turn to Duncan v.
Toyham, 8 C. & B. 225, in which CRESSWELL, J., told the jury,
that if the letter accepting the contract was put into the post-office
and lost by the negligence of the post-office authorities, the contract would nevertheless be complete, and both he and WiLDE, C.
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3., and MAULE, J., seem to have understood this ruling to have
been in accordance with Lord COTTENHAM'S opinion in Dunlop v.
Higgins. That opinion, therefore, appears to me to constitute an
authority directly binding on us. But if Dunlop v. Higgins were
out of the way, Harr.'a Case, supra, would still go far to govern the present. There it was held that the acceptance of the
offer at all events binds both parties from the time of the acceptance being posted, and so as to prevent any retraction of the offer
being of effect after the acceptance has been posted. Now, whatever in abstract discussion may be said as to the legal notion of its
being necessary, in order to the effecting of a valid and binding
contract, that the minds of the parties should be brought together
at one and the same moment, that notion is practically the foundation of English law upon the subject of the formation of contracts.
Unless, therefore, a contract constituted b' correspondence is absolutely concluded at the moment that the continuing offer is accepted
by the person to whom the offer is addressed, it is difficult to see
how the two minds are to be brought together at one and the same
moment. This was pointed out by Lord ELLENBOROUGH in the
case of Adams v. Lindsell, supra, which is recognised authority
upon this branch of law. But on the other hand, it is a principle
of law, as well established as the legal notion to which I have referred, that the minds of the two parties must be brought together
by mutual communication. An acceptance which only remains in
the breast of the acceptor, without being actually or by legal implication communicated to the offerer, is no binding acceptance. How
then are these elements of law to be harmonized in the case of con
tracts formed by correspondence through the post ? I see no better
mode than that of treating the post-office as the agent of both parties, and it was so considered by Lord ROMILLY in Hebb's Case,
Law Rep. 4 Eq. 9, where in the course of his judgment he said:
"Dunlop v. Higgins decides that the posting of a letter accepting
an offer constituted a binding contract, but the reason of that is,
that the post-office is the common agent of both parties." Also,
ALDERSON, B., in Stocken v. Collin, supra, a case of notice
of
dishonor, and the case referred to by Lord COTTENHAM, says,
"If the doctrine that the post-office is only the agent for the
delivery of the notice were correct, no one could safely avail himself of that mode of transmission."
But if the post-office be such common agent, then it seems to me
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to follow that, as soon as the letter of acceptance is delivered to the
post-office, the contract is made as complete and final and absolutely
binding as if the acceptor had put his letter into the hands of a
messenger, sent by the offerer himself as his agent, to deliver the
be
offer and receive the acceptance. What other principle can
acceptadopted short of holding that the contract is not complete by
ance until and except from the time that the letter containing the
acceptance is delivered to the offerer, a principle which has been
distinctly negatived? This difficulty was attempted to be got over
in The British and American Telegraph Company v. Colson, Law
the
Rep. 6 Exch. 108, which was a case directly on all-fours with
to
reported
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115,
page
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not
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contract takes effect from the
subsequent notification of it. As in the case now before the court,
if the letter of allotment had been delivered to the defendant in the
due course of the post, he would have become a shareholder from
6
the date of the letter, and to this effect is Potter v. Sanders,
conthe
that
arisen
has
Hare 1. And hence, perhaps, the mistake
is
tract is binding upon both parties at the time when the letter
written and put into the post, although never delivered, whereas,
only
although it may be binding from the time of acceptance, it is
binding at all when afterwards duly notified." But, with deference,
I would ask how a man can be said to be a shareholder at a time
in
before he was bound to take any shares; or, to put the question
the form in which it was put by M.ELLISH, L. J., in Harris's Case,
there
how there can be any relation back in a case of this kind as
con"the
said,
Justice
Lord
the
as
"If,"
may be in bankruptcy.
having
as
treated
be
to
is
time
in
arrived
tract after the letter has
been made from the time the letter is posted, the reason is that the
contract was actually made at the time when the letter was posted."
v.
The principles laid down in Harris's Case, as well as in Dunlop
BritThe
in
decision
the
with
Higgins, can really not be reconciled
ish and American Telegraph Company v. Colson. JAmEs, L. J.,
that
in the passage I have already quoted, affirms the proposition
afterwards
can
when once the acceptance is posted neither party
escape from the contract, and refers with approval to Hebb's Case,
epra. There a distinction was taken by the Master of the Rolls,
that the company chose to send the letter of allotment to their own
agent, who was not authorized by the applicant for shares to receive
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it on his behalf, and who never delivered it; but he at the same time
assumed that if, instead of sending it through an unauthorized
agent, they had sent it through the post-office, the applicant would
have been bound, although the letter had never been delivered
MELLISH, L. J., really goes as far, and states forcibly the result in
favor of this view. The mere suggestion thrown out at the close
of judgment, when stopping short of actually overruling the decision
in The British and American Telegraph Company v. (oson, Law
Rep. 6 Ex. 108, that although a contract is complete when the letter accepting an offer is posted, yet it may be subject to a condition
subsequent that if the letter does not arrive in due course of post,
then the parties may act on the assumption that the offer has not
been accepted, can hardly, when contrasted with the rest of his
judgment, be said to represent his own opinions as to the law upon
the subject. "The contract," as he says, "is actuallymadewhen the
letteris posted." The acceptor in posting the letter has, to use the language of Lord BLACKBURN, in Brogden v. Ihe Metropolitan Bailway Company, L. Rep. 2 App. Cas. 666, "put it out of his control,
and done an extraneous act which clenches the matter, and shows beyond all doubt that each side is bound." How then can a casualty
in the post, whether resulting in delay, which in commercial transactions is often as bad as no delivery, or in non-delivery, unbind the
parties or unmake the contract ? To me it appears that in practice
a contract complete upon the acceptance of an offer being posted,
but liable to be put an end to by an accident in the post, would be
more mischievous than a contract only binding upon the parties to
it upon the acceptance actually reaching the offerer, and I can see
no principle of law from which such an anomalous contract can be
deduced. There is no doubt that the implication of a complete,
final and absolutely binding contract being formed as soon as the
acceptance of an offer is posted, may in some cases lead to inconvenience and hardship. But such there must be at times in any view
of the law. It is impossible in transactions which pass between parties at a distance, and have to be carried on through the medium of
ewrespondence, to adjust conflicting rights between innocent parties, go as to make the consequences of mistake on the part of a
mutual agent fall equally upon the shoulders of both. At the same
time I am not prepared to admit that the implication in question
will lead'to any great or general inconvenience or hardship. An
offerer, if he choose, may always make the formation of the contract
VOL. XXVI.-24
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which he proposes dependent upon the actual communication to himself of the acceptance. If he trusts to the post, he trusts to a means
of communication which as a rule does not fail, and if no answer to
his offer is received by him, and the matter is of importance to him,
he can make inquiries of the person to whom his offer was addressed.
On the other hand, if the contract is not finally concluded except
in the event of the acceptance actually reaching the offerer, the door
would be opened to the perpetration of much fraud, and putting
aside this consideration, considerable delay in commercial transactions, in which dispatch is, as a rule, of the greatest consequence,
would be occasioned, for the acceptor would never be entirely safe
in acting upon his acceptance until he had received notice that his
letter of acceptance had reached its destination. Upon a balance
of convenience and inconvenience, it seems to me, applying with
slight alterations the language of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Taffloe v. The Merchants' Fire Rs. Co., 9 How. S. C.
U. S. 390, more consistent with the acts and declarations of the
parties in this case to consider the contract complete and absolutely binding on the transmission of the notice of allotment through
the post, as the medium of communication which the parties themselves contemplated, instead of postponing its completion till the
notice had been received by the defendant. Upon principle, therefore, as well as authority, I think that the judgment of LoPEs, J.,
was right, and should be affirmed, and that this appeal should, therefore, be dismissed.
BAGGALLAY,

L. J., delivered a concurring opinion.

,LL, L. J., dissenting.-The question in this case is not
BRA
whether the post-office was a proper medium of communication
from the plaintiff to the defendant. There is no doubt that i; is
so in all cases where personal service is not required. It is an
ordinary mode of communication, and every person who gives any
one the right to communicate with him gives the right to communicate in an ordinary, and so in this way; and to this extent,
that if an offer were made by letter in the morning to a person at
a place within half an hour's railway journey of the offerer, I
should say that an acceptance by post, though it did not reach the
offerer until the next morning, would be in time. Nor is the question
whether, when the letter reaches an offerer, the latter is bound ani
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the bargain made from the time the letter is posted or dispatched,
whether by post or otherwise. The question in this case is different.
I will presently state what in my judgment it is. Meanwhile, I
wish to mention some elementary propositions, which, if carefully
borne in mind, will assist in the determination of this case. First,
where a proposition to enter into a contract is made and accepted,
it is necessary, as a rule, to constitute the contract that there
should be a communication of that acceptance to the proposer (per
BRYAN, C. J., Year Book, 17 Ed. IV., fo. 1 and 2, plac. 2, cited in
Blackburn on Sales, p. 189). Secondly, that the present case is one
of proposal and acceptance. Thirdly, that as a consequence of or
involved in the first proposition, if the acceptance is written or
verbal-i. e., is by letter or message-as a rule, it must reach the
proposer, or there is no communication, and so no acceptance of
the offer. Fourthly, that if there is a difference where the acceptance is by a letter sent through the post, which does not reach the
offerer, it must be by virtue of some general rule or some particular
agreement of the parties. As, for instance, there might be an
agreement that the acceptance of the proposal may be by sending
the article offered by the proposer to be bought, or hanging out a
flag or sign, to be seen by the offerer as he goes by, or leaving
a letter at a certain place, or any other agreed mode, and in the
same way there might be an agreement that dropping a letter in a
post pillar-box or other place of reception should suffice. Fifthly,
that as there is no such special agreement in this case, the defendant, if bound, must be bound by some general rule which makes a
difference where the post-office is employed as the means of communication. Sixthly, that if there is any such general rule appli
cable to the communication of the acceptance of offers, it is equally
applicable to all communications that may be made by post; because, as I have said, the question is not whether this communication may be made by post. If, therefore, posting a letter which
does not reach is a sufficient communication of acceptance of an
offer, it is equally a communication of everything else which may
be communicated by post, e. g., a notice to quit. It is impossible
to hold, if I offer my landlord to sell him some hay, and he writes
accepting my offer, and in the same letter gives me notice to quit,
and posts his letter, which, however, does not reach me, that he has
communicated to me his acceptance of my offer but not his notice
to auit. Suppose a man has paid his tailor by check or bank note,
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and posts a letter containing a check or bank note to his tailor,
which never reaches, is the tailor paid? If he is, would he he if
he had never been paid before in that way? Suppose a man is in
the habit of sending checks or bank notes to his banker by post,
and posts a letter containing checks and bank notes, which never
reaches, is the banker liable ? Would he be if this was the first
instance of a remittance of the sort? In the case I have supposed
the tailor and banker may have recognised the mode of remittance
by sending back receipts, and by putting the money to the credit
of the remitter. Are they liable with that? Would they be liable
without it? The question then is, is posting a letter which is never
received a communication to the person addressed, or an equivalent, or something which dispenses with it? It is for those who
say it is to make good their contention. I ask why is it?
My answer beforehand to any argument that may be urged is,
that it is not a communication, and that there is no agreement to
take it as an equivalent for or to dispense with a communication;
that those who affirm the contrary say the thing which is not, that
if BRYAN, 0. J., had had to adjudicate on the case, he would
deliver the same judgment as that reported (vide smpra). That
because a man who may send a communication by post or otherwise sends it by post, he should bind the person addressed though
the communication never reaches him, while he would not so bind
him if he had sent it by hand, is impossible. There is no reason
in it. It is simply arbitrary. I ask whether any one who thinks
so is prepared to follow that opinion to its consequences? Suppose
the offer is to sell a particular chattel, and the letter accepting it
never arrives, is the property in the chattel transferred ? Suppose
it is to sell an estate or grant a lease, is the bargain completed?
The lease might b'e such as not to require a deed. Could a subsequent lessee be ejected by the would-be acceptor of the offer because
he had posted a letter? Suppose an article is advertised at so
much, and that it will be sent on receipt of a post-office order, is it
enough to post the letter ? If the word 11receipt" is reliedon,, is
it really meant that that makes a difference? If it should be said,
Let the offerer wait, the answer is, Maybe he will lose his market
meanwhile. Besides, his offer may be by advertisement to all mankind. Suppose a reward for information, and information does not
reach, and some one else gives it and is paid, is the offerer liable to
the first man ?
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It is said that a contrary rule would be hard on the would-be
acceptor, who may have made his arrangements on the footing that
the bargain was concluded. But to hold as contended would be
equally hard on the offerer, who may have made his arrangements on
the footing that his offer was not accepted. His non-receipt of any
communication may be attributable to the person to whom it was
made being absent. :What is he to do, but to act on the negative that
no communication has been made to him? Further, the use of the
post-office is no more authorized by the offerer than the "send an
answer by hand," and all these hardships would befall the person
posting the letter if he sent it by hand. Doubtless in that ease he
would be the person to suffer if the letter did not reach its destination. Why should his sending it by post relieve him of the loss
and cast it on the other party? It was said, if he sends it by
hand it is revocable, but not if he sends it by post, which makes
the difference. But it is revocable when sent by post; not that
the letter can be got back, but that its arrival might be anticipated by hand or telegram, and there is no case to show that such
anticipation would not prevent the letter from binding. It would
be a most alarming thing to say it would, and that a letter honestly but mistakenly written and posted must bind the writer, if
hours before its arrival he informed the person addressed that it
was coming, but was *wrong and recalled. Suppose a false but
honest character given, and the mistake found out after the letter
posted, and notice that it was wrong given to the person addressed.
Then, as was asked, is the principle to be applied to telegrams?
Further, it seems admitted that, if the proposer said, "Unless I
hear from you by return of post the offer is withdrawn," the letter
accepting it must reach him to bind him. There is indeed a case
recently reported in the Time8, before the Master of the Rolls,
where the offer was to be accepted within fourteen days, and it is
said to have been held that it was enough to post the letter on the
14th, though it would and did not reach the offerer until the 15th.
Of course there may have been something in that case not mentioned in the report; but as it stands it comes to this, that if an
offer is to be accepted in June, and there is a month's post between
the places, posting the letter on the 30th June will suffice, though
it does not reach till the 31st July; but that case does not affect this.
There the letter reached: here it has not. If it is not admitted
that "1unless I hear by return of post the offer is withdrawn" makes
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the receipt of the letter a condition, it is to say an express condition
goes for naught. If it is admitted, is it not what every letter says?
Are there to be fine distinctions, such as if the words are "unless
I hear from you by return of post," &c., it is necessary that the
letter should reach him, but "let me know by return of post," it is
not, or if in that case it is, yet it is not where~thee is'an offer without those words? Lord BLACKBURN said that MIELLISH, L. J.,
actually stated that where it is expressly or impliedly stated in the
offer "You may accept the offer by posting a letter," the moment
you pzst this letter the offer is accepted. I agree, and the same
thing is true of any mode of acceptance offered with the offer and
acted on, as firing a cannon, sending off a rocket, "give your answer
to my servant, the bearer." Lord BLACKBURN was not dealing
with the question before us; there was no doubt in the case before
him that the letters had reached. As to the authorities, I shall
not re-examine those in existence before Ie British and American Telegraph Company v. Colson, 8utpra. But I wish to say
a word as to Dunlop v. Higgins, supra, as the whole difficulty
has arisen from some expressions in that case. Mr. Finlay's argument and reference to the case when originally in the Scotch court
has satisfied me that Dunlop v. Higgins, supra, decided nothing
contrary to the defendant in this case. MELLISH, L. J., in Harris's
Case, supra, says so at p. 596 of the Law Reports. "That case
is not a direct decision on the point before us." It is true he adds
that he has great difficulty in reconciling the case of The Britishi
and American Telegraph Company v. Colson, supra, with Dunlop v. Higgins, supra. I do not share that difficulty. I think
that they are perfectly reconcilable, and that I have shown so.
Where a posted letter arrives the contract is complete on the posting.
So where a letter sent by hand arrives, the contract is complete
on the writing and delivery to the messenger. Why not? All the
extraordinary and mischievous consequences which the Lord Justice points out might happen if the law were otherwise when a
letter is posted, would equally happen where it is sent otherwise
than by the post. He adds that, "The question before the House
in Dunlop v. Higgins, supra, was whether the ruling of the Lord
Justice Clerk, was correct," and they held it was. Now, Mr.
Finlay showed very clearly that the Lord Justice decided nothing ificonsistent with the judgment in The British and American
Telegraph Co. v. Colson, supra. Since that case there have
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been two before MALINS, V. 0., in the earlier of which he thought
it "reasonable" and followed it. In the other, because thE Lord
Justices had in Harris's Case, supra, "thrown cold water upon
it," he appears to have thought it not reasonable. He says, "Suppose the sender of a letter says, II make you an offer, let me have
an answer by return of post.' By return the letter is posted,
and A. has done all that the person making the offer requests."
Now that is precisely what he has not done. He has not let him
"have an answer." He adds, "there is no default on his part.
Why should he be the only person to suffer ?" Very true. But
there is no default in the other, and why should he be the only
person to suffer?
The only other authority is the expression of opinion of LoPEs,
J., in the present ease. He says, the proposer may guard himself
against hardship by making the proposal expressly conditional on
the arrival of the answer within a definite time. But it need not
be express nor within a definite time. It is enough that it is to be
inferred that it is to be, and if it is to be it must be within a reasonable time. The mischievous consequences he points out do not
follow from that which I am contending for. I am at a loss to
see how the post-office is the agent for the parties. What is the
agency ? As to the sender it is merely to receive. But suppose
it is not an answer but an original communication, what then ?
Does the extent of the agency of the post office depend on the contents of the letter ? But if the post-office is the agent of both parties then the agent of both parties has failed in his duty, and to both.
Suppose the offerer says, "ly offer is conditioned on your answer
reaching me." Of whom is the post-office the agent then? But
how does the offerer make the post-office his agent, because he gives
the acceptor an option of using that or any other means of communication? I am of opinion that this judgment should be reversed. I am of opinion that there was no bargain between these
parties to allot and take shares; that to make such bargain there
should have been an acceptance of the defendant's offer, and a
communication to him of that acceptance; that there was no such
communication, and that posting a letter does not differ from other
attempts at communication in any of its consequences, save that it
is irrevocable as between the poster and the post-office. The difficulty has arisen from a mistake as to what was decided in Dunlop
v. Higgins, supra, and from supposing that because there is a
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right to have recourse to the post as a means of communication,
that right is attended with some peculiar consequences, and also
from supposing that because if the letter reaches, it binds from the
time of posting, it also binds though it never reaches. Mischief
may arise if my opinion prevails. It probably will not. As so
much has been said on the matter, that principle has been lost
sight of, I believe equal if not greater will, if it does not prevail.

I believe that the latter will be only obviated by the rule being
made nugatory, by every prudent man saying, "your answer by
post is only to bind if it reaches me." But the question is not to
be decided on these considerations. What is the law? What is the
principle? If BRYAN, C. J., had had to decide this, a public post
being instituted in his time, he would have said, the law is the
same now there is a post as it was before, namely, a communication to affect a man must be a communication, i. e., must reach

him.
Notwithstanding the dissenting opinion
of BRA-AWELL, L. J., the doctrine of this

case is believed to be a correct expression
of the law upon the point involved, both
in England and the United States. The
cases upon the subject in this country are
almost unanimous in stating the rule to
be that when an offer is made by letter
the contract is considered complete as
soon as the letter of acceptance has been
posted (and not from the time of its
receipt) provided it has been posted in a
reasonable time after the reception of the
offer and before notice of the withdrawal
of the offer. See Chiles v. lVelson, 7 Dana
281 ; Abbott v. Shepard, 48 N. H. 14;
.tockham v. Stockham, 32 Md. 196 ; Bryant v. Booze, 55 Geo. 438 ; Washburn v.
Fletcher, 42 Wis. 152; Vassar v. Camp,
11 N.Y. 441; s. c. 14 Barb. 341;
Levy v. Cohen, 4 Ga. I; WT7eat v. Cross,
31 Md. 103; Tayloe v. Insurance Co.,
9 How. 390; Hamilton v. Insurance Co.,
5 Penn. St. 339, per GIBsoN, C. J.;

Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103. The
opposing case of McCulloch v. The Eagle
Ins. Co., I Pick. 283, is against the
whole current of authority, both English
and American, and may be considered

Judgment affirmed.
as overruled.

See Hallocc v. Commer-

cial Ins. Co., 26 N. J. Law 268, 283.

The rule has also been held to be the
same in this country as well as in England, notwithstanding the letter of acceptance was never received: Washburn r.
.Petcherand Vassar v. Camp, supra.
The rule appears to be the same also
in cases where the contract is made by
telegraph: Minn. Oil Co. v. CollierLead
Co., 4 Dill. 431 ; Trevor v. Wood, 36
N. Y. 307. And an agreement to communicate by telegraph constitutes no warranty by either party that the telegram
shall be duly received: Trevor v. Wood,
supra.
There will be no contract, however, in
the case of a proposal by letter containing no limitation of time, unless the letter of acceptance is posted within a
reasonable time after the reception of the
offer: Martin v. Black, 21 Ala. 721 ;
Chicago 4- G. E. Railway Co. v. Dane,
43 N. Y. 240; Averill v. Hedge, 12
Conn. 424. The rule is the same in the
case of contracts by telegraph: Minn.
Oil Co. v. Collier Lead Co., supra.
The party making the offer may, however, make it a condition that the pro.
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posed contract shall not bind him till he
receives notice of acceptance, or unless
ne receives it by a specified time: Vassur v. Camp, supra. And where the
offer requires an answer within a certain
time, as "by return mail," the answer
and acceptance must be posted within
the limited time in order to constitute a
binding contract: Taylor v. Rennie, 35
Barb. 272; s. o. 22 How. Pr. 101;
Potts v. Whitehead, 20 N. J. Eq. 55;

acceptance, both of which letters were
received by the party making the offer
at the same time, and it was held by a
majority of the court that there was no
contract. A similar case is cited by
Merlin in his Repertoire de Jurisprudence, tit. Vente, sect. 1, art. 3, No. 11,
where an offer was made by letter to
purchase goods on certain conditions.
The offer was accepted by letter, but the
unconditional acceptance was recalled in
B. c. 23 Id. 512.
a subsequent letter in which certain modThe postage must be prepaid, and the ifications in the conditions were proposed.
mere deposit of a letter of acceptance in Both letters were received by the original
the post-office, postage not prepaid, will maker of the proposition at the same
not be sufficient to constitute a contract:
time, and he declined to perform the conBritton v. Phillips, 24 How. Pr. 111.
tract, and it was held that he was not
The letter of acceptance must, of
bound to do so, as the second answer
course, be properly directed, and if it is to his offer authorized him to consider
addressed to a place where the party the acceptance withdrawn: See Benj.
to be bound only occasionally resorts, it on Sales, 74. The decision in the last
must be proved to have been received by case is unquestionably correct, whichever
him: Potts v. Whitehead, supra.
view of the question of the effect of the
The offer by letter need not in all acceptance is taken; for even though a
cases be mailed directly to the person to contract was entered into when the unwhom it is made. A proposition to sell, conditional acceptance was sent, it was
contained in a letter sent by mail to the competent for the parties to rescind the
writer's agent or friend, with a request same, and the withdrawai of the acceptto communicate it, may, after communi- ance assented to by the proposer was cercation to the person for whom it was in- tainly equivalent to a rescission. But if
tended, be accepted by a written reply these cases should, notwithstanding their
from the latter addressed directly to the foreign origin, be considered as authorities
maker of the proposition; and in such for the proposition that there was no concase sending the reply to the post-office tract till the acceptance was made known
through the same agent or friend, 'first to the proposer, and no contract in the
permitting him to read it, and telling him cases in question, because the communiorally that the proposition is accepted,
cation and withdrawal of the acceptance
will not prevent the contract from being were simultaneous, it can be successfully
one made by letter; and the contract replied that they are clearly opposed to
will be closed, not from the time of leav- the current of authority both in this
ing the reply to be carried to the post- country and in England. Notwithstandoffice, but from the time of its delivery ing, however, the fact that the question
into the post-office : Bryant v. Booze, 55 seems settled upon authority, the dissentGa. 438.
ing opinion of the learned judge in the
In the Scotch ease of Dunrnore v. principal ease will be read with interest
Alexander, 9 Shaw & Dun. 190, the per- as a forcible expression of the arguments
son to whom the offer was made mailed in favor of the opposing view.
a lett-r accepting the offer, and sul~seMARSHALL D. Ewnz..
quently mailed a letter withdrawing his
Chicago, Dec. 23d 1879.
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